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Tens of thousands rally for peace in Aceh 
Tens of thousands of people from all parts of Aceh responded to a call to attend a Mass Rally for Peace 
issued by SIRA, the organisation which advocates the holding of a referendum in Aceh, but the vast 
majority were not allowed to reach their destination. The security forces were under orders to prevent 
people from travelling to Banda Aceh and opened fire in many districts , killing dozens of people 
The Mass Rally for Peace was scheduled to take place 
on 11 November, to mark the first anniversary of the mass 
rally in Banda Aceh on 8 November 1999 when a crowd of 
up to half a million converged on the provincial capital. On 
that occasion, the event proceeded peacefully. There were 
no attempts to prevent anyone from travelling to Banda 
Aceh and the security forces in the capital stood back and 
left security to stewards appointed by SIRA, the Centre of 
Information for a Referendum in Aceh. This time round 
however, things were very different. 
The plan was to hold a mass prayer in the precincts of the 
Baiturrahman Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh on Friday, 10 
November to be followed by a Mass Rally for Peace on the 
next day. 
Police under instructions to halt vehicles 
On 5 November, the Aceh chief of police, Chairul 
Rasyidi issued an instruction to all units to use all means at 
their disposal to prevent people from travelling to Banda 
Aceh. Security operations in Aceh are under the overall 
command of POLRI, the police force, while regular territo-
rial army units as well as special 'non-organic' forces regu-
larly take part in operations. 
The security forces were ordered to: 
* Patrol all public transport terminals. 
* Check passengers on all vehicles, private or public, includ 
ing their personal possessions. 
* Vehicles travelling in the direction of Banda Aceh should 
be immobilised with gunfire to flatten the tires. 
*Sweeping operations should be conducted by all command 
posts to ensure that no public or private means of transport 
get through to Banda Aceh. 
What actually happened went much farther than this. At 
the start of the week, people from outlying locations started 
to travel only to be confronted by units of Brimob, backed 
up by army troops. In many places they fired into the air, 
then shot at the crowds, killing or wounding unarmed and 
defenceless civilians. Thousands of people who tried to 
make their way to Banda Aceh by sea, mostly on small fish-
ing vessels, were also shot at and ordered to tum back. 
As the week proceeded, the number of casualties mounted 
by the day. Reports were being received by human rights 
activists in Banda Aceh, claiming that there had been many 
deaths in a number of locations in all the seven districts of 
the province. 
These reports suggested that the death toll had reached 
178 by Friday, 10 November. However, in most cases, there 
was no detailed confirmation of the casualties. 
Kontras-Aceh, the Commission for the Disappeared and 
the Victims of Violence, were more cautious and would only 
confirm casualties - deaths, wounded and detentions - based 
on detailed verification by witnesses, with the names of the 
victims, the circumstances of the incident and the security 
units involved. By the end of the week, they had monitored 
over 30 deaths. The final death toll is likely to be much 
higher but since the incidents occurred across such a wide 
area, it could take weeks before the final death toll is ascer-
tained. 
Brutality on a massive scale 
As reports of what was happening everywhere started 
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coming in, it became clear that the Indonesian armed forces 
were determined to prevent the Mass Rally from taking 
place, even if this meant confronting the entire population. 
In the event, they only helped to prove that almost the entire 
population of Aceh was on the move, wanting to go to 
Banda Aceh to attend the Mass Rally. The idea of support-
ing a referendum, as the only peaceful way to resolve the 
question of Aceh's future status, has clearly won over-
whelming support in 
Aceh and has almost 
certainly been reinforced 
by the latest events. 
The methods used 
included: 
* Opening fire on 
convoys, firing in the air 
and ordering people to 
turn back. 
* Immobilising means of 
transport by setting fire to 
vehicles which were 
forced to stop, ordering 
drivers to leave their vehi-
cles in police premises or 
armycommand 
compounds, flattening 
tires with gunshots , and 
confiscatingdriving licences. 
* Confiscating and destroying food supplies. 
* Forcing people to alight from vehicles and strip down to 
their underwear, and subjecting them to other forms of 
humiliation. 
* Blowing up bridges to prevent people from continuing 
with their journeys 
* Arresting people. 
* Halting and turning back people who try to approach the 
shore near the centre of Banda Aceh on boats. 
* Encircling villages and conducting raids to warn people 
not to depart for Banda Aceh. 
Personal testimonies 
One columnist who spoke to people who managed to reach 
Banda Aceh from Pidie wrote: 
'Having been turned back on the main roads by the police's 
elite Mobile Brigade (Brimob) unit and the Indonesian mili-
tary (TNI), they had travelled in trucks, buses and cars on 
the little known back roads of this beautiful rainforested 
province. One man said: "It took us seven hours to travel 80 
kms from Saree. We tried to get through on the main road 
but Brimob turned us away and even shot the tires of some 
of the vehicles. 
'A woman, two young children clinging to her, told me: 
"The military shot my husband in the rice field. Our convoy 
refused to go back and they (Brimob) started to shoot in the 
air. We all ran. Then they began to shoot at us. Several were 
injured and my husband died. We had no weapons, we are 
only farmers. They have the guns. I came with the convoy 
because my husband is already dead. What could I do? He 
would have wished me to come." 
'I myself witnessed people being shot at as they ran through 
rice paddies for cover, being made to sit in the blistering sun 
and ordered at gunpoint, alternatively to sing and pray, and 
tires of vehicles being shot at. This is the reality of democ-
racy, Indonesian style.' [Jakarta Post, 14 November] 
Gus Dur tries to halt violence 
After five days of brutality, President Abdurrahman Wahid 
commented on the events in Aceh for the first time. 
Infuriated by the shooting to death of so many people, he 
said he would summon TNI commander Admiral Widodo 
and army chief of staff General Endriartono Sutarto to ask 
why the security forces 
were shooting people in 
Aceh, 'just like the Dutch 
used to do. Do they think 
I'm afraid to sack 
...,.. anyone?' he asked 
rhetorically. He did 
indeed summon the TNI 
chiefs as well as the mili-
tary commander and 
police chief in Aceh, to 
halt the shooting and 
allow the Acehnese to 
proceed with the rally in 
Banda Aceh. However, 
no one has been sacked. 
Since June, the police 
force has been under the 
Huge crowds joining the mass rally direct authority of the 
President so it should have 
been quite straightforward for Gus Dur, as Wahid is popu-
larly known, to have stepped in much earlier and at least 
sacked the provincial chief of police whose instruction led 
to the brutality, but no such thing happened. 
This raises the crucial question about who is determining 
policy in Aceh. If not Gus Dur, then is it Vice President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose closeness to top generals is 
well known and who opposed Gus Dur's conciliatory policy 
towards West Papua? As is her style, she has said nothing, 
but halfway through the week preceding the Mass Rally, 
Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, 
retired Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, said on 
television that the rally for peace in Banda Aceh had not 
been banned. He later modified this statement by saying 
that 'if it is used to advocate separatism, it should be 
stopped'. 
Hundreds of thousands reach Banda Aceh 
By 11 November, hundreds of thousands of people had 
gathered in Banda Aceh, the majority of whom were from 
the city itself or from the district of Aceh Besar which 
surrounds the capital. Thousands had managed to get 
through the blockade but tens, probably hundreds, of thou-
sands of people were still trapped by blockades in many 
parts of Aceh. The final Mass Rally was postponed for 
several days while speeches condemning the brutality were 
delivered. The crowds said they wanted to remain in the city 
centre until the rest of the population could reach Banda 
Ac~h" But this plan was abandoned because of insuperable 
logistical problems and the people agreed to disperse and 
return home. On the following day, they rallied again and it 
was apparently the intention of the organisers to have rallies 
each day. 
General strike called 
At the final rally on 14 November, a decision adopted by 
leaders from all the districts was read out to rapturous 
applause. 
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The first point called for the withdrawal of all the security 
forces , army as well as police. 
The _second called for intervention by the UN or foreign 
countnes to resolve the political, social and humanitarian 
problems in Aceh. 
Point three demanded that the Government of Indonesia 
restore Aceh's sovereignty which had been unlawfully trans-
ferred to Indonesia as a result of the 1949 Round Table 
Conference agreement between Indonesia and Holland. 
~oint fo~r was directed towards the Dutch government, 
call mg for 1t to rescind the Netherlands' declaration of war 
on Aceh in 1873. 
Point five called on the Indonesian Government to accept 
responsibilities for all past atrocities, in particular the 
killings that preceded the Mass Rally. 
Finally, the leaders' declaration stated that if these demands 
we_re not met by 26 November, they would call for a general 
stnke throughout the territory from 27 November until 3 
December. 
Having decided to end the Mass Rally on 14 November 
Chairman ofSIRA Mohammad Nazar said: 'We feel so bad'. 
We organised a peaceful rally and it is resulting in the 
slaughter of innocent civilians. We have sent word to the 
villagers. Please do not try to come to Banda Aceh. We 
know you want to be here but please do not risk the lives of 
yourselves and your children. We cannot guarantee your 
safety as you travel here. [Jakarta Post, 14 November] 
Nazar is likely to be formally charged shortly by the police 
who announced in early November that they had summoned 
him to appear for questioning as a 'suspect'. He failed to 
respond to the first summons and is likely to be arrested if 
he ignores the third summons. The charges relate to a 
campaign conducted by SIRA at the time of Indonesia's 
national day, 17 August, when they refused to raise the 
Indonesian flag but raised the UN flag instead. This was 
tantamount, said the police, to acting as if Aceh was no 
longer a part of Indonesia. 
Polling on Aceh's future 
For ten days, prior to the Mass Rally, from 3 - 11 
November. SIRA activists conducted a poll of the entire 
population to ask people to choose between remaining with 
Indonesia or going independent. The poll came as the result 
of months of preparation and involved a network of activists 
extending down to every village in Aceh. More than 
2,750.000 ballot papers were printed. The results were 
announced on 14 November. They showed the 92 per cent 
voted in favour of independence, 0.13 per cent voted to stay 
with Indonesia, and 7.8 per cent abstained. 
In announcing the results, the coordinator of the event, 
Radhi Darmansyah, said it should be taken as a sign that the 
Acehnese were ready to take part in a legal and democratic 
referendum, and appealed to the international community to 
take heed of the aspirations of the Acehnese. 
The Centre's 'war against separatism' 
A grave political crisis has engulfed Indonesia during the 
course of 2000. Moves to removed President Wahid from 
power have gathered pace and could plunge the Republic 
into a crisis of implosion and disintegration. While this 
crisis has been fuelled by the bickering political elite, the 
Indonesian armed forces, the TNI, confront a myriad of 
problems, disunity within their own ranks, difficulties in 
confronting the discredited role they played under Suharto 
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and pressure for violators of crimes against humanity to be 
called to account. One of the key elements in the TNI fight-
back is to raise the spectre of 'separatism' which can only be 
crushed, they insist, by military operations in 'troublesome' 
provinces like Aceh and West Papua. All the emphasis is on 
keeping Indonesia intact, on stressing that the Republic 
must retain its unitary structure. Hence the recent practice 
of calling Indonesia Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia, 
or the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, NKRI. 
This paradigm has the advantage of providing the justifi-
cation for the TNl's continued internal security role to 
confront the 'separatists', at a time when a key element in 
the reformasi that inspired the movement to remove Suharto 
was to establish civilian supremacy over the military and 
restrict the TNI's role to external defence. 'Waging war 
against separatism' has now become the army's chief raison 
d'etre. This explains why the security forces have resorted to 
such violent methods to quell the pro-referendum move-
ment, as compared with their handling last year's mass rally. 
Humanitarian Pause accord under threat 
Talks that were to have been held in mid November 
betwe~n Indonesian government representatives and repre-
sentatives of GAM to consider political aspects of the 
Humanitarian Pause accord were unlikely to take place 
because GAM representatives announced that they would 
not attend because of the security situation and the killing of 
so many people who were trying to attend the Mass Rally. 
While efforts were being made to keep the talks on the 
road by the Henry Dunant Centre, it became clear that the 
security fo_rces on the Indonesian side are also unhappy 
about contmuance of the accord. At a press conference in 
Jakarta, the official spokesman of the Indonesian police 
said they were 'fed up', and wanted a 'free hand' to launch a 
crackdown on th~ rebels. Accusing GAM of using the 
accord to consolidate their position, he called on the 
Indonesian government to review it. [AFP, 14 November]* 
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Victims' Congress wants the world to hear 
For three days in early November, 375 victims coming from all parts of Aceh, met in Banda Aceh to 
share their experiences and discuss ways of drawing international attention to their desperate search 
for justice.A contact from the UK was in BandaAceh at the time and collected a number of testimonies 
which we include below. 
One of the decisions of the Congress was to appeal to the 
United Nations to pay serious attention to the human rights 
violations in Aceh. Jufri , chairman of the Organising 
Committee of the Congress., said that although the human 
rights situation in Aceh had been discussed for two years 
running at the UN, this had not led to any improvement in 
the situation on the ground. The Congress felt that the UN 
should become directly involved in bringing about an 
improvement and should call on the Indonesian government 
to withdraw all its troops from Aceh. 
The Congress also call for the violators to be called to 
account. This can only be done before a special human 
rights court functioning in accordance with international 
standards. Koneksitas courts in which military investigators 
and judges are involved are unacceptable. 
The Victims Congress set up a Council of Victims 
Representatives (Dewan Utusan Korban) which is the high-
est organ alongside the Executive Council. 
Victims testimonies 
Sept 1999 Alue Nireh, Aceh Timur. I have four children, 
the youngest (5 years) was murdered by the TNI. The chil-
dren were running around playing in the village, something 
blew on a truck and the military were surprised. They 
opened fire and my son, and another 5-year-old and three 
adults died. Very many were injured. 
Aceh Pidie, October 2000 (This interviewee is 16 years 
old). A few weeks ago my father was taken by the Brimob 
and shot dead. They took him to Guha Tujoh, about 16kms 
from my village. I saw this and I cried. When I cried the 
Brimob fired shots into the air to frighten me. There were 
others with me, they also saw it. When his body was found, 
he had been badly cut. I have six brothers and sisters, I am 
the eldest. 
Alverireh, East Aceh, 12 June 1999. Five trucks of TNI 
came to my village. They threatened us to make us leave our 
houses. But some people were too afraid to leave and 
thought they would be shot. My sister was too afraid to 
leave so they shot her with two others. She was still alive 
and I asked the BRIMOB to take her to a hospital, but they 
refused so she died, and the others also died. She was 15 
years old and two children were 4 and 6. This was part of a 
sweeping operation; in total five died that day in the village 
E. Aceh. September. It happened during a sweeping oper-
ation. The BRIMOB took my husband and my son. My son 
was 17 years old. I don't know why they took them, they did 
not ask if they were members of GAM, but they delivered 
them to the hospital dead the next day. I wish they had 
taken me also, I want to die. What am I to live for with-
out my husband and son? Their faces were all bruised. 
Banda Aceh, October 2000. The BRIMOB came to the 
coffee shop and took me to my house and asked me to 
show them where my gun was. I told them I don't have a 
gun. They took me away for almost one week. I thought I 
would die, my wife did not know where I was. The kicked 
me and beat me, and burned me with a flame (shows arm 
and back), then they punctured my skin with a metal rod. 
No, not a knife, this thing was not sharp and they had to 
force it through my skin (shows left-hand side). 
Matangkuli, N Aceh, 7 March 2000. The military came 
to my house. They tied my husband then they raped me. 
The soldier also hit me, took our money and some gold. 
There were two soldiers. At first they just wanted to take 
cash and harass me. All eleven houses in the village were 
visited. I was one of six women who were raped that day. 
Some of the raped women were newly married. After the 
rape, I felt physically sick, sick in my stomach. I told my 
husband what had happened and he was very angry. They 
untied him when they were finished with me. He didn't 
see the rape. Later, the commander came to the village 
and said he didn't believe us. I feel so sad because no one 
can help with my feelings, no one can make me feel 
better. Now I am afraid at home, in my house. I'm afraid 
the military will come to the village again. * 
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Military operations violate truce 
In the midst of a deepening crisis in Aceh where military operations have intensified despite the 
renewal of the Humanitarian Pause, and the death toll continues to rise, civil society has taken two 
important initiatives.A three-day Victims' Congress was held in BandaAceh and a two-day Mass Rally 
for Peace was convened. [See separate items.] 
On 2 September, the Humanitarian Pause was extended 
by agreement between the two sides, the Indonesian govern-
ment and GAM, the armed resistance. But far from result-
ing in a decline in the number of fatalities, no fewer than 
166 people were killed in the two months after the exten-
sion. The vast majority of those killed were civilians. The 
security forces lost 28 men while GAM lost 25 . Most of the 
civilian casualties were killed in the wake of operations by 
the security forces against villages. In many cases, villagers 
were seized and remained unaccounted for until their bodies 
were found. These days, hardly a day passes without one or 
two people being killed or bodies being found down ravines 
or by the roadside. 
GAM HQ attacked 
One of the most serious transgressions of the 
Humanitarian Pause by the Indonesian security forces was 
the attack on the headquarters of GAM in Teupin Raya, East 
Aceh on 24 October. Two members of GAM were killed, 
including a senior adviser, while no fewer than eight civil-
ians, including a 14-year-old boy, were killed during raids in 
nearby villages. Nineteen civilians disappeared and are still 
unaccounted for. 
Under the terms of the Humanitarian Pause, offensive 
actions are ruled out, and military operations should be kept 
to a minimum, so that humanitarian activities to go ahead 
unimpeded, to assist the tens of thousands who have fled 
their villages and are now living in squalor in makeshift 
camps. Such a breach ought to lead to investigations by the 
Joint Committee on Security Modalities with five members 
each from GAM and the Indonesian armed forces but there 
has been no report yet of this happening. 
The operation is the clearest sign yet that the Indonesian 
armed forces are far from happy about the continuance of 
the Pause. It may reflect their fear that GAM is gaining in 
popularity and consolidating its military position, as well as 
frustration with the heavy losses sustained by the security 
forces, especially Brimob, the special police combat force. 
According to Cordova, which monitors violations of the 
Pause, on 23 October, the day before the attack, a large 
number of troops surrounded two villages, Cot Baroh and 
Cot Tunong. This may have been a softening up operation to 
search for people suspected of having GAM sympathies. 
At crack of dawn the following day, as local people were 
completing early morning prayers, dozens of troops arrived 
in a truck and seven jeeps and surrounded the area in a 
pincer movement. They opened fired at random, causing 
people to run in all directions. While the gunfire continued, 
a number of people were rounded up and forced into a 
truck. Other troops then appeared from Teupin Raya with a 
number of people in custody, including two GAM members. 
Local people saw the two GAM members being roughed up 
and executed on the spot. Similarly brutal treatment was 
meted out to the civilians, resulting in eight more deaths. 
About one thousand villages fled the area in fear of their 
lives. 
Troops to protect government buildings 
In a move which seems designed to strengthen the role of 
the military over civilian affairs, the Aceh chief of police 
announced that security personnel will be deployed to 
protect government buildings. He said the aim was prevent-
ing attacks on government installations which is crippling 
the functioning of local government. 
One human rights group in Aceh estimates that at least 14 
government buildings to have been attacked since the start 
of the second phase of the Humanitarian Pause. In early 
November, GAM forces attacked a warehouse of the oil and 
gas company, Exxon Mobil, during which 16,000 packages 
of explosives were seized. 
But the decision was strongly condemned by Kontras-
Aceh, the Commission for Disappearances and the Victims 
of Violence, whose coordinator, Aguswandi, said it would 
only intensify the prevailing sense of fear of security forces 
throughout Aceh, and further reinforce the role of the mili-
tary; the end result would be to intensify the armed conflict 
which the Humanitarian Pause is supposed to curb. He 
called on President Wahid to cut back the number of troops 
in the province. 
'Love-the-mosque' operation 
The operation bear the name, Operasi I Cinta Meunasah, 
Operation 'Love the Mosque' I. Sr Superintendant Ridwan 
Karim, the senior ranking Brimob officer on the Joint 
Committee for Security Modalities, has denied that his side 
is engaged in military operations. Claiming that Indonesia 
'has never conducted any military operations in Aceh,' he 
said that the aim of the operation was 'to create a conducive 
atmosphere'. While claiming that the police were in control 
of operations, he admitted that the army was also involved, 
saying that 'this is not against the law'. [Jakarta Post, 1 
November] 
Markets torched 
A fairly frequent occurrence in this 'love-the-mosque' 
operation is the torching of market places, which results in 
extensive loss of property and curtailment of economic 
activity. 
The most devastating of these totally unprovoked attacks 
occurred on 12 October when the popular Ulee Gle Market, 
Bandardua sub-district, district of Pidie, was razed to the 
ground. The third largest market in Pidie, Ulee Ole Market 
was grew to its present size over many years, and consisted 
of scores of well-built shops and residences (ruko) and 
street stalls. It had become a vibrant and well patronised 
centre for the sale of locally-produced commodities from a 
wide area, as well as household goods and clothes .. 
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the peaceful atmosphere 
continued on page 8 
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Seeking the truth about G30S 
In the last few months at least a dozen new books and numerous articles have been published in 
Indonesia about the G30S tragedy, the most dramatic event in modern Indonesian history, which led to 
the birth of Suharto's Orde Baru. While for more than three decades the official version blamed the 
PK/, the Indonesian Communist Party, for killing six generals, the main thrust of the present writings 
is to seek the truth behind G30S. 
Nowadays, the term G30S (Gerakan 30 September), the 
30 September Movement, is widely used but while Suharto 
was in power, people were more or less obliged to call it 
G30S/PKI, to make it clear that the 30 September 
Movement was organised by the PKI. This change in name 
looks insignificant but it signifies a dramatic 
political shift, a sign that public perception is 
changing and raising serious doubts about the 
validity of the official version. 
The monopoly of information was virtually 
absolute during the Orde Baru, particularly 
regarding G30S. A film called Pengchianatan 
G30S/PKI (The Betrayal of G30S/PKI). It was 
screened every year on all TV channels and 
polls indicate that until recently, 97% of the 
population believed the official version. Three 
decades of brainwashing still has a grip on the 
minds of average Indonesian. A recent poll by 
the leading political weekly, TEMPO, reveals 
significant shifts. Asked about what really 
happened on 30 September, 78 per cent said 
PKI abducted the generals and 31 per cent said 
that Suharto attempted to overthrow Sukarno. 
Asked who masterminded the G30S, 71 per 
cent said, Aidit, the PKI chairman and 44% said 
Suharto was the culprit. An overwhelming 95 per 
cent of respondents thought that school textbooks should be 
revised on the G30S events thought 50 per cent believe that 
the textbooks are broadly speaking correct. The polling 
team was disappointed with the 'conservative' nature of the 
answers. It concluded that only a minority have taken the 
trouble to read and analyse new information about G30S in 
the last two years. They concluded that the impact of Orde 
Baru indoctrination is still strong. 
Soebandrio and Heru Atmodjo versions 
The G30S accounts by Soebandrio and Heru Atmodjo are 
among the latest accounts and shed new light on the 
dramatic events in 1965. Soebandrio was Foreign Minister 
in 1965 while Lt-Colonel Heru Atmodjo was a key intelli-
gence officer in the air force. They were both arrested in the 
early days of the Orde Baru and received heavy sentences 
by kangaroo courts. Soebandrio was sentenced to death 
while Heru Atmodjo was sentenced to life. Soebandrio's 
sentence was commuted to life while Heru Atmodjo served 
15 years in jail. 
In October 1965 Soebandrio was arguably Indonesia's 
second most powerful man after President Sukarno, the 
First Vice-Prime Minister and head of BPI, the state intelli-
gence body. He spoke lengthily with Lt. Colonel Untung, 
who led the G30S operation to kidnap the generals, before 
his execution as they were together on death row. 
According to Soebandrio, Suharto set up two teams, both 
consisting of former officers of the Central Java 
Diponegoro division. In the mid-fifties Suharto was 
Terror in 1965, an unprecedented red drive 
commander of this division and he enjoyed close, long-
standing relations with the men in both teams. The first 
team was led by Untung and Latief, both key people in the 
kidnapping of the generals while the second team was led 
by Ali Murtopo and Yoga Sugama, key intelligence officers. 
Untung told Soebandrio that Suharto promised to support 
the G30S movement, if necessary by providing more troops 
for the operation. 
But Suharto used this first team to implement an oper-
ation that was designed to fail. The second team was in 
charge of the real plot. They emerged as victors and the 
PKI became the scapegoat, responsible for killing the 
generals. This line of thought is fully backed by Heru 
Atmodjo who wrote a fifteen-page account about the 
G30S events. A condensed version is published in a sepa-
rate article in this issue: G30S an army intelligence opera-
tion. Soebandrio's manuscript had difficulty finding a 
publisher (the first publisher backed out, fearing repercus-
sions from Suharto loyalists) while Heru Atmodjo's 
account is circulating widely in photocopy form. 
Soebandr~o's book is titled Kesaksianku tentang G30S 
(~y Testimony about G30S) and is bound to appear in 
pnnt soon. 
Heru draws the conclusion that the G30S movement was 
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designed to fail. He fails to understand why Syam, a nobody 
in Indonesian politics, was in charge of the preparations and 
Untung, a middle ranking officer with few operational 
skills, was in charge of the kidnapping. Syam led a shady 
agency called Biro Khusus (Special Bureau) whose main 
job was to infiltrate the armed forces and report only to PK.I 
chair Aidit. The vast majority of PK.I leaders and members 
knew nothing about this Special Bureau and military prose-
cutors claim that they created the name for practical 
reasons. 
Latiefs Defence Plea 
The other officer directly involved in the kidnaps was 
Colonel Latief, one of the very few plotters who is still 
alive. Latief s account has been known for some time in 
political circles but only became available to the general 
public when his defence plea at the Jakarta military court in 
1978 was published earlier this year. Like Untung, Latief 
Political Prisoners at Buru island in the early seventies 
Photo:PeterSchumacher 
fully trusted Major-General Suharto and informed him 
about the G30S operation on two occasions, on 28 
September and on the night of 30 September. The operation 
was a preventive action when rumours of a military coup 
were widespread. The kidnapped generals were supposed to 
be presented to President Sukarno and held accountable for 
their plans. However, six generals were killed while the 
seventh escaped. Latief insists that that the plan was only to 
bring the generals to the palace but others involved in the 
operation received orders to murder the officers. Latiefs 
defence plea of 1978 has finally appeared in paperback, 
published by ISAI under the title: Pledoi Kol. A. Latief, 
Soeharto Terlibat G30S (Defence Plea Colonel A. Latief, 
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Suharto's Involvement in G30S.). Previously it was avail-
able in a mimeograph edition and was regarded as subver-
sive reading. 
First Indonesian PhD on 1965 killings 
Hermawan Sulistyo, an outspoken academic, wrote his 
PhD in 1993 on the mass killings in Jombang and Kediri, 
East Java in 1965-66 but only now has his dissertation been 
published in Indonesian under the title Palu Arit di Ladang 
Tebu,. (KP Gramedia, 2000). Sulistyo grew up in the area 
where numerous killings occurred, mostly at the hands of 
members of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the largest Muslim 
organisation in Indonesia which is very strong in East Java. 
He comes from an NU background and remembers vividly 
how, as a young boy, he pushed corpses into the river with 
sticks of wood. It is widely understood that the mass killings 
in Central Java were carried out by the army special forces 
but in East Java many of the killings of alleged communists 
or sympathisers were carried out by NU people. Through 
extensive interviewing, Sulistyo concluded that military 
involvement in the killings was also structural in East Java. 
NU members were incited by being shown documents of 
death lists of NU leaders supposedly prepared by the PK.I. 
'It's them or us' became the general cry for a witch-hunt 
against innocent members of trade unions, peasant unions 
and other organisations. He gives a gruesome account of 
what happened in Kediri on 17 October 1965, when the 
atmosphere was already very tense and many people had 
been taken into custody by the military. The military 
commander told some informal leaders that the military 
could not cope with the huge number of prisoners and asked 
them to 'get rid of the problem, giving a graphic description 
of how to do it. In the night, some 15,000 prisoners were 
taken to empty schools and killed, with military in plain 
clothes taking part. 
TAPOL, MIK, Solidamor publication 
Three NGOs, MIK and Solidamor in Jakarta and TAPOL 
in London, published a reader: Plot TNI AD - Barat Di 
Balik Tragedi 1965 ( The Army - West Plot Behind the 1965 
Tragedy ) with a range of articles by Coen Holtzappel, WF 
Wertheim, David fohnson, Kathy Kadane, Ralph McGehee, 
Mark Curtis and Mike Head, for the first time available in 
Indonesian. The articles, written between 1979 and 1999, 
were selected by an editorial team in Jakarta under Bonar 
Tigor Naipospos and Rahadi T. Wiratama. While Holtzappel 
(see his article in this issue) and Wertheim dealt with 
domestic aspects, the other translated articles deal with the 
geo-political situation and the pro-active policy by MI6 and 
CIA to get rid of Sukarno and the PK.I. This is the first in a 
series of books by the same NGOs. It certainly wont be the 
last word on the role of foreign secret services in the events 
of 1965. 
Other publications 
Several other publications should be mentioned in helping 
solve the riddle about G30S. 
Another important book recently published is: Mendung 
Diatas Istana Merdeka (Mist Over Merdeka Palace), Sinar 
Harapan, 2000. The author is Atmadji Sumarkidjo, a long-
time military watcher. He deals with extensive material 
from Teperpu (Team Pemeriksa Pusat, Central Investigation 
Team) in particular, two former members of the team, 
retired Major-General Tahir and retired Colonel Djiwo 
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Soegondo. The book can be described as an unofficial army 
version of G30S. Here, the blame is no longer placed 
squarely on the PK.I as a whole but rather on the Special 
Bureau (Biro Khusus) run by the mysterious Syam with the 
full support of Aidit, the PKI chair. Much of the book is 
devoted to a history of the PKI since 1948 as seen by the 
military, which provides useful insights for the public . 
Another NGO, the Sumatra Human Rights Watch Network 
(SHRWN), based in Medan, recently published Naiknya 
Para Jenderal (The Coming to Power of the Generals). This 
is a edited version of chapter six of: Tragedi Manusia dan 
Kemanusiaan (Human and Humanitarian Tragedy), 
published by TAPOL in 1996 by M.R.Siregar, an 
Indonesian political refugee in the Netherlands who wrote 
his version of G30S based on many articles written inside 
and outside Indonesia. 
Articles in the press 
All the main political weeklies, notably Gamma, Tempo 
and Forum published important articles about G30S in 
October. Most of the books mentioned above have been 
reviewed by the weeklies, but new probing and analytical 
writings have also appeared. Forum made a useful rundown 
of the different versions of the G30S events, TEMPO 
conducted an opinion poll on G30S while GAMMA had a 
scoop with its report of the troubles surrounding the 
Soebandrio manuscript. In a long analytical article in 
Gamma, UPI historian Asvi Warman Adam draws the 
conclusion that there is ample evidence of Suharto's 
involvement in the G30S events. He concludes with an 
appeal: if there is not the political will to charge Suharto on 
nepotism and corruption, he should be charged in the 'court 
of history' for his crimes against humanity. 
Film about 1965 killings in Aceh 
In March this year, the highly-rated film director, Garin 
Nugroho, appeared with a powerful film, Puisi Tak 
Terkuburkan (Unburied Poetry). The action takes place 
throughout inside a prison camp in Aceh in October 1965 
where scores of men and women were being held. Each day, 
prisoners are called by name, sacks are placed over their 
heads and they are taken off to be slaughtered. The camera 
dwells on the harrowing condition of the prisoners, their 
attempts to live through the horror of not knowing when 
they will be called, and light-hearted chatter to relieve the 
tension. The story is told through the eyes of an Acehnese 
poet, Ibrahim Kadir, who was arrested but later released 
because of mistaken identity. Kadir is still alive and plays 
himself in the film. The film was shown at the London Film 
Festival in November. * 
NEW PUBLICATION 
PLOT TNI AD - BARAT 
DIBALIK TRAGEDI '65 
Published by MIK, Solidamor & TAPOL 
A reader with articles by WF Wertheim, C. 
Holtzappel, David Johnson, Mark Curtis a.o. 
continued from page 5 . . . 
was suddenly shattered by the sound of gunfire as m1_htary 
vehicles transporting Brimob troops drove past. Ch1~dren 
squatting by the roadside and people in the shops fled m all 
directions and the shops were hastily shuttered. The troops 
jumped down from the vehicles, firing into the air, and 
started kicking down doors and ordering the inhabitants out. 
Suddenly, one of the shops was engulfed in flames and 
within minutes, the entire market was ablaze. In all, 98 
shops and 33 market stalls were completely destroyed, as 
well as a large number of cycles, motorbikes and cars . The 
traumatised shopkeepers and stall-owners who had stood 
watching their possessions go up in smoke, were powerless 
to halt the conflagration. They had lost everything apart 
from the clothes they were wearing, while the impact on the 
local economy will be severe and long-lasting. 
Brimob officers later claimed they acted in response to a 
grenade attack by GAM on their vehicles which led to a 
firefight, but local witnesses strongly denied this. Two 
people were shot dead during the operation. 
Two days later, another market-place in Tiro sub-district, 
also in Pidie, was torched with the loss of 85 shops and 
homes.[Kompas, 1 November] * 
itor: Bonar Tigar Naiporapos • 'Jtabadi T. wtrat 
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G30S, an army intelligence operation 
In October this year, a number of articles were published about the events of 1 October 1965, also called 
the G30S, which led to Suharto's seizure of power and ushered in his military dictatorship which 
gripped Indonesia for 33 years. Several articles challenged the view that the PK/ was to blame and 
discussed the role of Suharto himself. The following extracts are from an account recently sent to 
TAPOL by Heru Atmodjo, an air force officer who was deputy head of AURI's intelligence department 
in 1965. Heru was sentenced to life and released after serving 15 years. 
In 1965, during konfrontasi with Malaysia, a British 
aircraft carrier with fighter aircraft and escorted by several 
destroyers and a supply ship entered the Sunda Strait on its 
way to Christmas Island. They were staging a show of force 
under our very noses. After intense reconnaissance, Air 
Force commander, Air Marshal Omar Dani who was 
concurrently commander of the Komando Mandala Siaga 
(Kolaga), the theatre of war command for konfrontasi, 
placed his forces on a state of high alert. Through diplo-
matic channels, the British embassy in Jakarta was urged to 
ensure that fighter planes be disarmed. For the first time in 
our history, a foreign naval convoy was warned not to enter 
our territorial waters. 
CIA's 'first priority target' 
In the 1950s and 1960s, US intelligence saw the non-
aligned countries as a threat to US interests. The countries 
that attended the Asian-African conference in Bandung in 
1955 succeeded in building a powerful movement which 
subsequently spread to Latin America. The leaders of this 
movement, Sukarno, Nehru and Nasser, came to be 
regarded by the CIA as 'first priority targets'. The CIA 
supported opposition parties and encouraged them to 
oppose our government, recruiting agents and setting up 
communications networks. CIA support for the 
PRRI/Permesta rebellions in 1958 was evidence of their 
efforts to overthrow Sukarno and they supported several 
attempts on the life of the Indonesian president. 
Once he had been identified as a 'first priority target', 
Sukarno was closely watched by the US intelligence 
community and his name appeared daily in the press. 
Arming the people 
After Suknaro held discussions with Chou En-lai about 
arming the people, a delegation headed by Dr Subandrio, 
Deputy Prime Minister, visited China and was offered 
100,000 small arms free of charge. The idea was approved 
by KOTI, the Supreme Command, at a meeting also 
attended by General Nasution but the agreement was never 
put into practice. However, it was widely alleged that AURI 
had received a shipment of 25,000 small arms from China 
as a way of discrediting the force. 
As konfrontasi reached a climax in late 1965, all the 
armed forces were conducting training of volunteers. AURI 
was smaller than the other forces (only 18,000 men as 
compared to 300,000 men in the army). The AURI comman-
der therefore suggested that people living within a radius of 
5 kms of airbases should be given training to help defend 
the bases. But before any instructions had been issued, 
Major Suyono who was commander of AURI's airbase 
defence force, PPP, went ahead and gave training to groups 
of people at Kebon Karet, Pondok Gede, located outside the 
parameters of the Halim Perdanakusumah airbase. Initially, 
the training was for people from across the political spec-
trum and was in line with the idea of protecting the airbase. 
But it subsequently became apparent that only communist-
affiliated groups such as Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani and 
SOBSI were involved. There was a discussion about this 
within AURI and a decision was taken that the training 
should stop. 
Kostrad battalions to Jakarta 
In preparation for Armed Forces Day on 5 October 1965, 
two battalions of Kostrad (the army's strategic command, 
then under the command of Major-General Suharto), 
Battalion 530 from East Java and Battalion 454 from 
Central Java, were instructed to come to Jakarta. The order 
was sent on 15 September and repeated by radiogram No 
239/9 on 21 September. 
Meanwhile, a meeting of so-called 'progressive officers' 
was held in August to discuss the Council of Generals and 
the president's state of health. Present at the meeting were 
Colonel Latief, commander of the Jakarta Infantry Brigade, 
Lt.Colonel Untung, of the Cakrabirawa (palace guard) 
battalion, Major Sigit, commander of 201 Jakarta Infantry 
Brigade, Major Suyono of AURI, and two civilians, Syam 
Kamaruzzman and Pono who were later known to be the 
links to D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI (the communist 
party) and his Biro Khusus or Special Bureau. 
As Sudisman, member of the PKI's politbureau told me 
when I met him in prison before his execution, the other 
chairmen of the PKI were not authorised to have anything to 
do with this Special Bureau which had its own lines of 
communication. It was strictly separate from the legal party 
and the party's central committee only received reports from 
Aidit. Syam was the head of the Special Bureau. The offi-
cers at that August meeting regarded Syam as the represen-
tative of Aidit. Similar meetings were held in Central and 
East Java which suggests that the Kostrad battalions from 
those two regions had been summoned to Jakarta on a 
special mission also related to the Council of Generals and 
the president's state of health. 
As we know, Kostrad was under the command of Major-
General Suharto and his First Assistant (Intelligence) was 
Lt-Colonel Ali Murtopo. This also suggests that Syam had 
direct links with Kostrad which meant that information 
about the PKI and the 'progressive officers' as they were 
known, was being fed to the army, and vice versa, informa-
tion about the army was being fed to the PKI. 
During the latter weeks of September, I was busy with 
preparations to open an Air Force Officers' Intelligence 
School on 1 October. Until then, we had only six well-
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trained intelligence officers in the force. AURI operations 
deputy, Commodore Dewanto, as Director of AURI 
Intelligence, was very enthusiastic about this school and the 
navy asked to send officers to receive training in air intelli-
gence. 
On 30 September, whilst these preparations were under-
way, two senior officers came to AURI headquarters to 
report on political developments. An officer from Madiun, 
East Java said the PK.I masses were holding demonstrations, 
shouting slogans against the 'bureaucratic capitalists' and 
'imperialist compradores', recalling the situation there in 
1948 (when the PK.I is alleged to have attempted to set up 
local soviets), while the other officer reported a demonstra-
tion in Jakarta with the slogan 'what are we waiting for?'. 
Retired Colonel Latiefjust published his book accusing General 
Suharto of direct involvement in the G30S kidnapping. 
I wanted to check this information, but failing to find the 
Deputy for Operations at his office, I sought information 
from AURI officers working with other forces but they 
knew nothing and suggested that I consult Major Suyono 
because he was in contact with people outside the Air Force, 
so this is what I did. I went to see him at his home and he 
didn't beat about the bush. He told me that a revolutionary 
situation was developing and becoming unstoppable. A 
Council of Generals was planning to seize power on 5 
October. Progressive officers in the army would not stand 
by and allow their superiors to get involved in a counter-
revolutionary movement. They believed it was better 'to pre-
empt rather than be pre-empted'. The generals were going to 
be arrested and taken to the president. The progressive offi-
cers had two Kostrad battalions at their disposal, he said, 
plus the presidential guard under Untung and an infantry 
brigade under Latief. The action would take place that night 
and Brigadier-General Supardjo, commander of the Second 
Combat Force in West Kalimantan, had also arrived in 
Jakarta. 
Suyono told me he had decided to join forces with these 
officers, along with the people's forces which were under-
going training under his instruction. He said that whether or 
not the commander of AURI approved, they were planning 
to use PT Aerial Survey (PENAS) as their Central 
Command, located outside Halim airbase and would make 
use of AURI vehicles and weapons. 
I warned him that he was going too far, but he said he was 
doing everything on his own responsibility and was ready to 
take the consequences. Even when I told him I would report 
what he had told me to the commander of AURI, he refused 
to change his mind. He felt sure the commander would 
agree with what he was doing. He also gave me the names 
of the seven generals who would be taken into custody. 
I came to the conclusion that the movement was being led 
by Brig-General Supardjo as the most senior office, a well 
educated man who had received training in Pakistan. He 
was, moreover, serving under Kolaga which was 
commanded by AURI's commander, Omar Dani so I 
decided to go and report all this to him immediately. I 
also told Omar Dani that Supardjo (who I had never 
met) had arrived in Jakarta. He told me to visit him at 
his residence at 8 pm to report this to the AURI deputy 
chiefs. I was also instructed to find Supardjo and ask 
how this might impact on the president's security which 
was what we were concerned about. 
I visited Suyono again at his home and was told that 
Supardjo would be at PENAS at 5 am the following 
morning. When I returned to headquarters to meet the 
deputies, I reminded them that I was due to go to Bogor 
the following day to open the intelligence school but I 
was ordered to remain in Jakarta. 
To the Palace with Supardjo 
I went to PENAS as arranged and was introduced to 
Supardjo and also to Untung and Latief and to two civil-
ians whose names were not mentioned at the time. I later 
realised they were Syam and Pono. I told Supardjo the 
AURI commander wanted to know what was going on 
and he said I should go with him to the palace to meet 
the president and from there we would go to the AURI 
commander. Just before I left PENAS, I heard two civil-
ians say: 'Nas (Nasution) got away, all the others were 
caught.' 
We drove by jeep to the palace and Supardjo went inside 
while I waited at a guard post outside. After a while, he 
came out to tell me that the president wasn't there so I 
decided to return to AURI headquarters. When I arrived, 
Commodore Dewanto was there. He turned the radio on at 
7 am and we heard that the progressive officers had taken 
the Council of Generals into custody. He ordered me to go 
to Halim Airbase to tell Omar Dani that Supardjo was still 
at the palace. He told me that the president would be coming 
to Halim (a normal procedure during times of crisis) and 
that I should take a helicopter to the palace to fetch 
Supardjo. I did so and took him to Halim. That was as far as 
my duties werit and I had no idea at the time whether the 
president arrived in Halim. 
Revolutionary Council announced 
Later that morning, it was announced that a Revolutionary 
Council would be set up, and I was named as a deputy 
chairman along with other officers, under Untung as chair-
man; No one had every spoken to fl""' about this council. 
Whpe I was wi~h those officers, I r , , heard Untung or 
Lat1ef say anythmg. The ones who a.d all the talking were 
the two civilians, Syam and Pono. They were the ones 
receiving and sending letters but I didn't know what it was 
all about. I am quite certain that none of the people named 
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as members of the Revolutionary Council knew that their 
names would be included. 
On the way to the palace, I had seen the two battalions, 
454 and 530 on the streets. They didn't halt Supardjo's vehi-
cle. I couldn't work out who they were there to confront. 
Later I came to know that the 30 September Movement 
consisted of: Pasukan Pasopati, a unit of troops under the 
command of first lieutenant Dul Arip, Pasukan Bimasakti 
under Captain Suradi and Pasukan Cadangan Pringgodani 
under Suyono and Sukrisno. My assumption that Supardjo 
was the leader of the movement turned out to be wrong 
because all the announcements were made in the name of 
Untung though I hadn't seen Untung lead anything. 
I knew that training being given by Major Suyono had 
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finally released from Cipinang Prison on 31 August 1980 
after serving 15 years. 
When I met Untung in prison, I remarked that we had been 
acquainted in those days and no one had consulted me about 
anything. He told me he had met Aidit on 26 September who 
asked him: 'Are you ready?' to which he replied, 'I'm a mili-
tary man and when I receive orders, I always carry them out. ' 
Untung told me that he wasn't the leader of the movement 
but had only signed the things he was asked to sign. The 
person who was really in charge was Syam, not Supardjo or 
Latief. As far as I could see, Untung didn't have the educa-
tion or capacity to lead such a movement. But I find it diffi-
cult to believe that Syam was in charge of a military move-
ment. I am convinced that the movement was designed to 
fail. The facts show that the whole thing was guided 
by a mysterious person, that it was a 'covert opera-
tion' . But who was behind it? There are two possi-
bilities: 
The first is that supporters of Sukarno were behind 
it. They could be described as misguided, foolhardy, 
rash adventurers and there were many such people 
within the ranks of Sukarno's supporters. 
Two young officers, Lt.Colonel Yoga Sugama (left) and Major Ali Murtopo, 
portrayed together in 1959. Their cooperation with Suharto blossomed and in 
the sixties they will emerge as the intelligence-supremos of the New Order. 
The other possibility is the CIA or MI-6 from Britain 
was behind it, helped by people who had been plan-
ning things for a long time. The planning was very 
complex. The aim was to overthrow Sukarno but to 
do it in stages. There were several intermediary 
targets as well as the ultimate target. One of the 
targets was the air force, a strong supporter of 
Sukarno and also equipped with very modern 
weaponry. The plot was to allege that Halim airbase 
was the base of the G30S. Sukarno would be there, 
Omar Dani would be there, the leadership of the 
movement would be there, and therefore Halim 
would have to be destroyed. 
Others who supported Sukarno were the PK.I and 
left-nationalist masses which would have to be elim-
taken place in Pondok Gede, along the Jakarta-Bogor road 
(where there was also a well called Lubang Suaya). When 
we in the air force spoke about 'Lubang Buaya', we were 
referring to an airstrip used by our fighter planes and for 
paratroop training. Many officers such as Benny Murdani 
and Sarwo Edhie were well acquainted with the location of 
our Lubang Buaya airstrip because they had done training 
there and also knew that PENAS was situated outside Halim 
airbase. 
I never saw either the president or Aidit at Halim. I heard 
that Aidit asked for a plane to take him to Yogyakarta but I 
am pretty sure that Aidit and the president did not meet each 
other at Halim. Later that day, we heard that Suharto had 
refused to allow Major-General Pranoto to comply with an 
order to go to meet the president at Halim (Sukarno was 
intending to ask Pranoto to take over command of the armed 
forces in place of General Yani, one of the kidnapped gener-
als) and that by late afternoon, Suharto had taken control of 
the radio transmission building, the Telkom building, had 
closed off the capital city and declared a curfew. 
A movement designed to fail 
I was tried before an Extraordinary Military Tribunal and 
accused of rebellion against the lawful government. I was 
given a life sentence and spent time in many prisons. I was 
inated politically and ideologically. This was done by 
means of psywar and propaganda and at the core of this 
propaganda was Lubang Buaya which became a very well-
known name. 
The generals had been taken as planned to Lubang Buaya 
and were handed over to the man in charge, Dul Arif. He 
was the man who ordered their execution. Stories about eyes 
being gouged out, sex organs being slashed and licentious 
dances taking place was part of the plot to destroy the revo-
lutionary forces which supported Sukarno. Suharto knew 
this, Ali Murtopo knew this. But when a forensic team 
which examined the bodies of the generals failed to confirm 
the reports of mutilation, they ignored it. According t9 this 
plot, the masses of people would be incited to murder PK.I 
people, members of Gerwani, Pemuda Rakyat, SOB SI, etc. 
The army and Sarwo Edhie were the ones who helped this 
to happen. 
Sudisman told me that the existence of the Special Bureau 
was a fatal weakness of the party. He also said that there was 
rivalry between Aidit and Nyoto, with the latter being very 
close to Sukarno. There were even indications that Nyoto 
was planning to set up another party. Although there were 
serious splits in the party, the 30 September movement was 
clearly an adventurist-military action, unrelated to the 
party's Marxist-Leninist ideology, according to Sudisman. 
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G30S, an army intelligence operation 
Sukarno had long been a 'first priority target' but the CIA 
knew they couldn't overthrow him directly or assassinate 
him. They had many agents including people who didn't 
even know they were being used. 
If we look again at the meeting held in August between 
progressive officers and Syam and Pono and the link with 
Kostrad's instruction for two battalions to come to Jakarta, 
there were Special Bureau people in Kostrad and vice versa. 
Each side had information about the other. 
On 1 October, the fully armed Kostrad battalions were 
stationed in Monas Square. Lt-Colonel Ali Murtopo, 
Kostrad's intelligence chief, went there to speak to the 
battalion commanders and 'win them over', after which the 
commanders accompanied him to Kostrad HQ. Soon after, 
the radio 
building 
w a s 
seized 
without a 
s h 0 t 
being 
fired. 
Suharto 
t h e n 
e 
offensive 
without 
firing a 
s h 0 t . 
Suharto 
sent an 
ultima-
tum to 
Sukarno 
saying 
that the 
Suharto in 1965, the beginning of a 32-year iron-fist rule 
Halim, the 'headquarters of the G30S' would be cleaned out. 
The city was closed off and a curfew imposed. Just compare 
this to what happened before the action when a suggestion 
mad by Major Suradi for the city to be closed off, was 
strongly rejected as being 'adventurist'. 
The G30S was part of a comprehensive strategy to take 
control the state. The generals were kidnapped to implant a 
feeling of revenge within the armed forces. Such a thing 
had never happened before, kidnapping six generals. It 
provoked widespread condemnation and calls for the phys-
ical annihilation of these traitors to the nation. But at this 
point, Suharto did nothing to Sukarno. His intelligence 
officer was Ali Murtopo who later became the key intelli-
gence officer during the first decades of the New Order, in 
charge of intelligence, security, political engineering, the 
government system and the composition of parliament. 
They created the impression that Halim was the headquar-
ters of the G30S. No one knew that the Lubang Buaya 
inside Halim was different from the Lubang Buaya in 
Pondok Gede which became known far and wide. 
Fabricated stories about eyes being gouged and penises 
being slashed was used in a psywar to incite feelings of 
revenge. Sukarno was branded as the G30S superman. 
Gerwani was smashed and its reputation was utterly 
destroyed. AURI, whose role had been vital in ousting the 
Dutch from West Irian became the target of false propa-
ganda. After all this had been achieved, their attention 
turned to Sukarno. But they needed a formal basis, accept-
able to legal experts and the international community. This 
was the 11 March 1966 letter which became know as super-
semar which Sukarno signed, giving authority to Suharto to 
preserve order. 
Ali Murtopo 
Ali Murtopo had served under General Yani (one of the 
murdered generals) but was punished for a number of 
misdeeds and removed to the unit which later became 
Kostrad. He recruited Benny Murdani who became one of 
his proteges, a leading intelligence officer since the days of 
konfrontasi. 
Ali Murtopo was very close to Dul Arip, who 
commanded the Pasopati troops of G30S and also to 
Jahurup who led the kidnap gang which failed to capture 
Nasution. On their way back east, Jahurup abandoned his 
troops near Tambun, east of Bekasi. When Dul Arip 
arrived in Brebes, he handed his troops over to another 
officer, and there are witnesses who can testify that he was 
taken away by Ali Murtopo. What happened to these two 
men is shrouded in mystery. They never appeared in court. 
Their disappearance cut off a critical line of intelligence, a 
classical CIA method. 
The first PKI leader to be murdered was Nyoto, after 
attending a cabinet meeting. He had been in North Sumatra 
at the time of the G30S and knew nothing about it. After 
being arrested, he was taken from the military prison and 
killed without any process. His elimination removed a key 
source of information about the party's contacts with 
Sukarno. Murtopo and many other senior officers had been 
sworn in by Syam as part of the Special Bureau, they are 
inseparable from Syam. Suharto came to power with the 
help of the Special Bureau/PK!. 
The G30S was not a military movement to seize power. It 
was Suharto who carried out the military movement, clos-
ing off the city and seizing power. Although Untung was the 
one who announced the 30 September movement and 
removed the cabinet from office by setting up a revolution-
ary council, it was Suharto and his military movement who 
systematically seized power by military means. Although 
Untung appeared to be the leader, it was Syam who 
controlled everything. Although Untung later took responsi-
bility for everything and agreed to take the consequences, 
all he did was to sign things. The whole action was engi-
neered by one person and that one person was Syam. The 
link between Syam and Suharto is the thing that needs to be 
probed. 
The entire intelligence operation was run by Murtopo: 
destroying the evidence, killing Nyoto, destroying links 
with other regional PKI leaders who could have revealed 
many things, and murdering Aidit. 
Suharto's operation made deliberate use of psywar to 
destroy the PKI by means of inciting mass sentiment. 
People today, including members of parliament, say that the 
PKI murdered millions of people but the fact is that the 
G30S killed six generals and a junior officer, as well as 
Nasution's daughter and an officer in Central Java. But 
hundreds of thousands of people were murdered by Suharto. 
Statistics will one day provide the true figure. It is estimated 
that between one and two million innocent people fell 
victim to this slaughter. * 
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G-30-S TRAGEDY 
Coen Holtzappel's contribution 
In TAPOL Buletin No.159,August/September 2000, we made some critical remarks on an article writ-
ten by Coen Holtzappel in 1979. It is more than just and along the tradition of proper journalistic 
standards the editors have created space for him to react on this matter. We thank Coen Holtzappel for 
his contribution. 
Somewhat surprised, I took cognizance of a column in the 
November issue of TAPOL Bulletin, containing a poor 
review of a 1979 article of mine concerning the so-called 
1965 coup. The reason was that a surviving and recently-
released participant in the Untung action read a recent 
Indonesian translation of the article which is included in a 
book entitled Plot TNI-Barat Dibalik Tragedi 1965 recently 
published in Indonesian by three NGOs, including TAPOL. 
This is a curious case of TAPOL openly disavowing a 
contribution to a book which they themselves published, 
hardly an advertisement for the book or the publisher. I have 
not seen book and my permission was not sought for the 
inclusion of my article, which is itself grounds for objec-
tion. To put it mildly, I find this procedure rather unusual 
and stress that I do not take responsible for the Indonesian 
version. 
I can only react on the column on the basis of my article 
published in 1979 in the Journal of Contemporary Asia 
edited by the late professor Wim Wertheim. The purpose of 
that thematic issue was to bring together articles of acade-
mic quality condemning the brutal force by which Soeharto 
had come to power and maintained his grip on power. My 
own article was intended - on the basis of official docu-
ments of the first trials of leaders of the G30S - to examine 
whether the official Indonesian version of the G30S was 
correct. This held that the G30S was a coup d'etat against 
Soekarno, led by the Indonesian communist party, executed 
by communist officers and intended as a stepping stone to a 
communist takeover. An important part of this representa-
tion was the horror story of the generals having been 
bestially murdered by members of the communist youth 
movement Pemuda Rakjat and the communist women's 
movement Gerwani. This was used to legitimise Soeharto's 
takeover after the Untung action. 
My 1979 article established that the action of former Lt-
Colonel Untung was a patriotic deed by units and offic~rs of 
the Indonesian army and air force to protect President 
Soekamo against the evil plans of a number of generals who 
had formed a council of generals, intending to take power 
on 5 October, Armed Forces Day. After kidnapping the 
generals, the leaders reported their action t? Soekamo and 
sought his blessing (restu). They obeyed his order to stop 
the bloodshed and prevent further troop movements. The 
conclusion was that Untung and his companions were loyal 
to Soekamo and did not stage a coup d'etat. 
The Untung action received support from so-called 
sukarelawans (volunteers). In the official v_ersi_on, they 
were members of communist undercover orgamzatlons. But 
from the trial proceedings, it became clear that the volun-
teers had been trained under military supervision to support 
confrontation with Malaysia, guarding military installations 
against western attack in an invasion ?r weste~-ins.pi~ed 
covert actions against military installations. This t~ammg 
was entirely legal and was endorsed by _Soekamo hims~lf. 
Their deployment as part of Untung's action was, accordmg 
to the proceedings of the Untung and Njono trials, limited 
to guarding PK.I buildings near Halim Perdana~suma 
airbase against actions of Council of Generals. They did not 
partake in killing the generals and were not even at Lubang 
Buaya, because they were guarding PK.I buildings. In actual 
fact, the ones who killed the generals were from the troops 
participating in Untung's action, as the perpetrators and 
those who had ordered them to do this themselves admitted 
during Untung's trial. 
Concerning the involvement of the central leadership of 
the PKI, all that could be ascertained, based on the docu-
ments of the trial of Njono, the leader of the PK.I South 
Jakarta Committee, was that the PKI leadership knew about 
the Untung-led action and reported this to the president. The 
PK.I decided to let these officers have their way while not 
getting involved. Although PK.I chairman Aidit was in the 
vicinity while Soekamo was at the Halim airbase on the day 
of the Untung action, there was no evidence that he was in 
contact with either the president or Untung and his compan-
ions. The claim that Aidit's emissaries Aidit, Messrs Syam 
and Pono, took part in the Untung movement and that they 
were members of Aidit's special bureau for covert actions, 
could not be established from the proceedings. Actually, it 
was the intention of the leading officers in Untung's action 
not to have civilians, let alone poiiticians, involved in their 
planning and action. After initially being forced to admit 
that they were communists, Untung and his witnesses later 
withdrew these confessions during the latter's trial. 
Thus, nothing credible was left from the official version 
of Soeharto and the armed forces. The action was not a 
coup d'etat and the PKI neither inspired it nor had any inten-
tion of staging a coup. Nor were the generals murdered by 
the communists. Untung and his companions were not 
communists. The Untung action was an internal military 
affair. My 1979 article was not 'inaccurate and outdated' as 
alleged in your column. Its conclusions are still valid and 
dispute the official version. Last but not least, they could be 
established from court proceedings which, according to 
public opinion, had been 'manipulated by the Soeharto 
regime' to support the official version, as stated in your 
column. 
I made some remarks in my article about the role of the 
Indonesian Air Force and some of its officers in the Untung 
action, including Mr Heru Atmodjo. According to your 
column he objects to my views on their role. I look forward 
to reading what he will reveal in your journal. In due course 
I will return to the subject and update my 1979 article with 
material that was not then available. * 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
Kontras foun,der gets major rights award 
One of Indonesia's foremost human rights activist, Munir, has been selected as a recipient of this year's 
Right Livelihood Award, an award that is widely acknowledged as 'the alternative Nobel prize. 
The citation states that he is being honoured 'for his 
courage and dedication in fighting for human rights and the 
civilian control of the military in the world's fifth most 
populous country'. The award ceremony will take place in 
the Swedish Parliament on 8 December. 
Even while still a law student in East Java, Munir who is 
now 35 years old, became involved in cases to support 
farmers confronted by military violence. When he joined 
the staff of the East Java Legal Aid Institute, he focused 
primarily on labour issues. After moving to Jakarta, he 
came to public prominence shortly before the downfall of 
Suharto when two dozen pro-democracy activists were 
abducted. The campaign which he spearheaded resulted in 
the release of eleven of the men being released ( 13 are still 
missing) and a group of junior military officers being 
brought to trial. 
At the height of this campaign, he founded Kontras, the 
Commission for Disappearances and the Victims of 
Violence. Kontras has gained an enviable reputation for 
opposing political violence, encouraging respect for due 
process, ensuring victims' physical and psychological 
recovery and promoting reconciliation and peace. The 
Commission has a regular publication which reports on acts 
of violence and has project offices in Aceh, Jayapura, 
Lampung, Medan, Surabaya and Ambon, and some netting 
committees in West Kalimantan. 
In 1999 Munir was appointed a member of the 
Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in East 
Timor which produced a wealth of evidence of the 
Indonesian army's involvement in recruiting, financing, 
training and using the militia which caused such havoc at 
the time of the UN referendum in East Timor. 
He also teaches human rights in army and police courses 
and was a member of the drafting committee for a law on 
human rights court which is still awaiting enactment by 
Parliament. 
In 1998, he received the prestigious Yap Thiam Hien 
human rights award and in 1999, he was named Man of the 
Year by a leading Muslim periodical, UMMAT, and as 
'young leader for the Millennium in Asia' by Asiaweek in 
2000. 
While still chairing the Management Committee of 
Kontras, Munir also heads the operational division of 
YLBHI, the Indonesian Human Rights Foundation. 
This is the second time an RLA award has gone to 
Indonesia. In 1995, the Indonesian human rights activist 
Carmel Budiardjo was a recipient of the Right Livelihood 
Award. * 
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EASTTIMOR 
La' o Hamutuk: Monitoring the Transition 
'La'o Hamutuk' (Tetumfor Walking Together) is a joint East Timorese-international organisation that 
has come together to monitor and report on the activities of the principal international institutions 
currently participating in the evolving development and reconstruction in Tim or Lorosa 'e. This short 
article will look at La'o Hamutuk's work to date and some of the major concerns currently being raised 
by Timorese civil society, as they move closer towards full independence. 
Since June this year, in the quiet Dili suburb of Becusi 
Bawah, Timorese NGO workers have regularly gathered 
with La'o Hamutuk's staffers to voice their concerns about 
the central role they want to play in the transitional process. 
The Saturday morning meetings give the chance for groups 
like FOKUPERS, CDEP, HABURAS and CDHTL to have 
open discussions with representatives from the World Bank, 
UNTAET, USAid and other institutions that are playing a 
major role in the physical and social reconstruction of the 
country. The organisation believes that the people of Timor 
Lorosa'e must be the ultimate arbiters of the reconstruction 
process and that the process should be as democratic and 
transparent as possible. 
Getting Started 
Although it did not get off the ground in Dili until May 
this year and is operating with a minimal budget, the La'o 
Hamutuk staff has established itself well within the 'devel-
opment industry' whose practitioners now swarm the place. 
It was one of the first groups to criticise the international 
community for marginalising FALINTIL, the East Timorese 
resistance army, an issue that has since been partially 
addressed by UNTAET. It produced a well-received review 
of the humanitarian situation. By providing non-partisan 
analyses of, and information about, international activities 
in a regular bulletin and workshops, La'o Hamutuk aims to 
facilitate greater levels of effective Timorese participation 
in the reconstruction and development of the country. For 
Timorese or solidarity groups abroad, La'o Hamutuk has a 
web site and a discussion page. 
In the coming months, the staff of two Timorese and two 
foreigners will focus largely on the large health and agri-
cultural rehabilitation projects being administred by the 
World Bank Administrated Trust Fund (TFET), whilst 
supporting a growing number of concerns that are being 
raised by other Timorese NGOs. 
Current Concerns 
Whilst some Timorese leaders openly praise UNTAET for 
having established an all-Timorese National Council and 
despite Kofi Annan's claim that East Timor has recovered from 
last September's destruction, there are many Timorese who still 
wonder when they will start to see some real changes. 
In light of the recent UN Security Council visit to East and 
West Tim or and the third donors ' meeting for East Timor in 
Brussels in December, the National NGO Forum has voiced 
major concerns about the development process. The Forum, 
which represents over 100 NGOs, has called for greater trans-
parency and participation, the immediate creation of a mecha-
nism that would give NGOs more access to funding for human 
resource development, gender education, agriculture, health, 
environment and human rights and reconciliation. 
Major setbacks recently became apparent in judicial affairs, 
after East Timor Transitional Administration's (ETTA - the 
embryonic government of East Timor) budget revealed that 
investigations into serious crimes will be restricted to only four 
cases. The others, including the horrendous Suai Church 
massacre will be put on hold. UNTAET's inability to deal with 
these serious crimes raises major questions about the UN's 
commitment to human rights and justice. 
Many Timorese NGOs, under the banner of the Forum, have 
also called for the suspension of UNTAET's civic education 
programme, criticising for being non-transparent, non-democ-
ratic and failing to address the desires of the people. The fail-
ure to provide communication and transport to the isolated people 
of Oe-cusse has long been an issue for the Forum and La'o 
Hamutuk. UNTAET has yet to respond to either of these issues. 
Other major concerns raised by Timorese are tertiary educa-
tion and housing. The University of Timor Lorosa'e (UNTIL) 
was due to open in early October but a lack of funds has 
limited the number of students and teaching resources will be 
minimal. Joao Carrascalao, the cabinet member for infrastruc-
ture, claims that his budget for rebuilding homes and providing 
power is far too low. In Dili only those with business contacts 
or employment have so far been able rebuild their homes. 
Creating Space 
The international community's inability to create space in the 
system for local participation is undoubtedly the result of by 
the lack of information available to local people in Tetum, 
Bahasa Indonesia or Portuguese. The UN's universal policy of 
using English as its official language greatly benefits the 
hundreds of local UN and international agency staff but 
isolates most Timorese. 
The enormity of the damage inflicted by the TNI on the 
physical and social fabric of the country in 1999, and the 
twenty-three year occupation is unmeasurable. Despite the 
millions of dollars donated to building the new nation, those 
responsible for transitional decisions are aware that there is a 
very thin margin of error. As UNTAET edges closer to hand-
ing full sovereignty over to the Timorese, this margin of error 
will undoubtedly narrow and the expectations of the nation and 
especially civil society will rise. La'o Hamutuk's continuing 
role wiil be to work with the Timorese to create more space for 
them in both central and peripheral issues leading to indepen-
dence and beyond. 
· Scott Cunliffe was based in Dili from October 1999 and 
volunteered for La'o Hamutuk between July and August 
2000. For more details about La'o Hamutuk contact 
blyswc@hotmail.com or www.etan.orgAh 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
Justice on trial in Indonesia and East Timor 
The Indonesian justice system is in crisis as former President Suharto's son, Tommy, is on _the ~un fro'!' 
an 18-month jail term for corruption and notorious militia leader, Eurico Guterres, 1m_pl1cated m 
crimes against humanity in East Timor, is feted as a national hero. A new law on ~uman rig_hts cou_rts 
has been passed, but may not be effective in dealing with past crimes. Meanwhile, there is growing 
concern about the UN's lack of commitment to criminal prosecutions in East Timor. 
The new law on human rights courts was passed by the 
House of Representatives (DPR) on 6 November, just a few 
days ahead of a UN Security Council mission to Indonesia 
and East Timor. It was evidently pushed through in an 
attempt to persuade the international community that 
Indonesia is capable of handling human rights cases and to 
undermine demands for an international tribunal on East 
Tim or. 
Prosecuting past crimes 
Much attention was focused on whether the new law 
would allow for the trial of those implicated in past rights 
abuses , particularly those associated with last year's 
violence in East Timor. A recent constitutional amendment 
- Article 28(1) - granted an amnesty to past abusers by intro-
ducing the principle of 'non-retroactivity' into Indonesian 
law without exception [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 159, 
Aug/Sept 2000, p. 18]. 
Nevertheless, Article 43 of the new law gives the 
President the power, on the recommendation of the DPR, to 
set up ad hoc courts to try cases involving past crimes, in 
apparent contravention of the amendment. Minister of 
Justice and Human Rights, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, insisted 
that Article 43 would be effective despite the amendment 
though the reason for his confidence is not immediately 
clear from the legislation. 
An explanatory note appended to the new law argues that 
because ad hoc courts are for the protection of human 
rights, the restrictions imposed by the 'non-retroactivity' 
principle must be waived. In support of this argument, it 
cites another constitutional amendment - Article 28(J)(2) -
which reads: 'In executing the rights and freedoms of every 
person it is necessary to waive any restrictions set forth in 
law for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the recognition and 
upholding the rights and freedoms of another person, in the 
interests of justice and in consideration of moral and reli-
gious values, security and public order in a democratic soci-
ety.' 
However, this amendment appears to be capable of waiv-
ing restrictions only in ordinary laws, which are subordinate 
to the Constitution. It is difficult to see how it can restrict 
another constitutional provision which is absolute in its 
terms. Article 28(1) reads: 'The right not to be charged on 
the basis of retroactivity is a basic human right that may not 
be breached under any circumstances.' 
Lawyers acting for military officers accused of crimes in 
East Timor have already said they will use the non-retroac-
tivity principle to save their clients from prosecution. A 
further amendment to the Constitution is likely to be needed 
if past cases are to be successfully prosecuted. 
In any event, the highly politicised nature of the process 
is likely to protect senior officers from prosecution. The 
Attorney General, Marzuki Darusman, has anno~n~ed that 
22 military and police officers, government officials and 
militia members accused of human rights violations in East 
Timor will go on trial in January, but that remains unlikely 
so long as the military faction and its political allies in 
Parliament are involved in the decision to set up ad hoc 
courts, as provided for under the new law. TAPOL has 
already argued that this should be a judicial process and that 
decisions on whether to pursue past abusers should not be 
taken by politicians. The same applies to the appointment of 
personnel involved in the inquiry, investigation and prose-
cutions phases, which is also open to political interference 
under the new law. 
It has been suggested by Asmara Nababan, the Secretary-
General of the National Commission on Human Right 
East Timorese refugees in Wast Timor looking at Indonesian 
soldier 
(Komnas HAM), in response to a request for an inquiry into 
the 1965/66 killings, that Komnas HAM will not infuture be 
able to set up inquiry teams to investigate past atrocities 
without a request by the DPR to the Government (Kompas, 
21November2000). 
TAPOL would question whether the new law goes this 
far. There appears to be nothing in the new law which 
requires the DPR to request an inquiry. The DPR has to 
recommend the setting up of an ad hoc court to hear a 
case of gross violations, but Komnas HAM is responsible 
for carrying out the initial inquiry. The law specifically 
states that the purpose of an inquiry is 'to identify the 
existence or otherwise of an incident suspected to consti-
tute a gross violation of human rights ... ' (Article 1(5)). 
Unlessan incident has been identifiedas a gross violation 
by a Komnas HAM inquiry, the DPR has no apparent 
authority to intervene. 
In any event, it is difficult to see how the DPR could make 
an objective and properly-informed decision on whether to 
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set up an ad hoc court without the findings of prior inquiry 
by Komnas HAM (and a subsequent investigation by the 
Attorney General as required by the law). It would be 
extremely regrettable if the DPR were to assume an effec-
tive veto over any inquiry into past violations . 
Improvements don't go far enough 
Otherwise, the DPR appears to have taken account of 
comments on the draft law made by TAPOL and other 
NGOs. Some welcome improvements have been made, but 
the law retains several defects. In particular, the DPR has 
taken the extremely regressive step of adding the death 
penalty as a possible sentence for certain crimes. It go~s 
without saying that the death penalty must have no place m 
human rights legislation. 
The new law includes an improved definition of 'gross 
violations of human rights'. There is now a requirement that 
crimes against humanity must be committed as part of a 
'broad or systematic, direct attack on civilians'. In the 
explanatory notes to the law, a 'direct attack on civilians' is 
defined as 'an action taken against civilians in follow up of 
a policy of an authority or policy related to an or~anisati~n'. 
In theory, this should lessen the danger of crimes bemg 
passed off as ordinary crimes c?m1:11itted by. soldi.ers .and 
junior officers and increase the hkehhood of mvest1gat10ns 
exposing the responsibility of senior officers and officials 
for rights violations. The definition of crimes against 
humanity now broadly follows that in the 1998 Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court ('the Rome 
Statute'), as does the definition of command responsibility. 
The fact that the DPR has followed international standards 
set out in the Rome Statute is encouraging. 
The law includes new provisions on arrest and detention. 
These would appear to allow for a maximum period of 120 
days (90 days for the investigation phas~ and 30 days for the 
prosecution phase) before a detamee . is brought befor~ a 
judge. In its 1999 report on Indonesia, the UN Workmg 
Group on Arbitrary Detentions noted that such delays were 
inconsistent with the right to a fair trial. However, another 
impediment to a fair trial, which would have allowed courts 
to conduct a trial in the absence of the accused, has been 
removed. 
Despite these technical changes to the. law, th~ pr~cess of 
bringing perpetrators of past human righ~s ~1~lat1ons to 
justice is still dependent on a deeply fla~ed Judicial system. 
A complete overhaul will be reqmred to ensure that 
professional, independent and impartial l~gal perso~nel are 
available to carry investigations, prosecutions and trials. 
An example of the problems inherent in the curr~nt 
system is revealed in a report presented to the l!N" Security 
Council mission by a group of NGOs m West T1mor. They 
allege that those arrested by the Indonesian police for the 
murder of three UNHCR workers in Atambua [see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No. 159, Aug/Sept 2000, p. 16] are 'sta1:1d-ins' and 
that the police have failed to int~rvie~ a key witness who 
could provide evidence as to the identity of the real perpe-
trators. 
The necessary changes to the justice system will ta~e 
many years to complete. In the meantime, the ~rguments ~n 
favour of an international tribunal for East T1mor remam 
irrefutable notwithstanding the passing of the new law. 
UNTAET fails to fulfil its justice mandate 
The demand for an international tribunal was repeated by 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
the East Timor NGO Forum during its meeting in Dili with 
the Security Council mission on 13 Novembe~. The ~GO 
Forum is alarmed that the prosecutor for serious crimes 
recently announced he has had to abandon plans to i~vest!­
gate the ten most serious crimes last year and confme his 
attention to just four cases due to a lack of resources. 
Without an international tribunal, there is little prospect that 
the chief perpetrators will face trial, the Forum says. . 
It cites the April 2000 memorandum of understa~d1~g 
between UNTAET and Indonesia regarding co-operation m 
legal judicial and human rights-related matters, and points 
out that no transfer of suspects between jurisdictions have 
taken place as allowed for under the memorandum and none 
is expected. . . 
The continuing delays in conductmg exhumations and 
investigations are likely to result in ~videnc~ being lost, 
destroyed, damaged or becoming unreliable with the result 
that successful prosecutions will be impossible. Already 
UNTAET has been forced to release suspects who have 
confessed to murder and rape because of a lack of resources 
to pursue investigations. . 
The NGO Forum concludes that UNTAET, by not provid-
ing sufficient resources for investigations, is fail~ng to carry 
out its mandate to bring to justice those responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The problem appears 
to be not a lack of money, but the way in which UN money 
is allocated. The special crimes unit is run by the shadow 
East Timor government known as the East Timor 
Transitional Administration (ETTA) which is under-funded 
and under-staffed, lacking basic necessities, such as inter-
preters, transport and computers. Meanwhile the resources 
available for reconciliation and a possible truth and recon-
ciliation commission, which come under the general 
UNTAET budget, are much greater. 
A British police officer said: 'The majority ~f staf!' ca~e 
here on the understanding that they would be mvestJgatmg 
serious crimes to prosecute those responsible for attacks last 
year. While we accept that there is always ~oing to be 
competing interests for resources, we are surprised that we 
have been here for six months and still, on a daily basis, we 
are fighting for basic equipment in order to function ... we've 
had to beg steal and borrow anything we can do to ensure 
we finish the work.' [South China Morning Post, 14 
November 2000] 
While the NGO Forum also seeks reconciliation, it argues 
that bringing the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity to justice is an essential element of recon-
ciliation. It calls on the Security Council to instruct 
UNTAET to reallocate substantial resources to criminal 
investigations. TAPOL fully supports the NGO Forum in 
this demand. * 
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Hawk aircraft terrorise West Papua 
In late September and early October, British-made Hawk JOO and 200 series ground-attack aircraft 
conducted a series of operations over towns in West Papua in a show of strength designed to strike fear 
into supporters of independence. A clear pattern is now emerging of Hawks being used to intimidate 
local people in areas of conflict. Meanwhile, Britain continues to export spare parts for the Hawks and 
other lethal equipment such as armoured vehicles 
Three Hawks were sent to West Papua's main Air Force 
base at Biak at the end of September as part of a special 
military operation aimed at cracking down on the indepen-
dence movement. Air Force Marshall Ali Musiri Rape 
ominously described the purpose of the Hawk deployment 
as: 'Tactical operations by means of a show of force if 
requested by any party to safeguard situations.'[Pikiran 
Merdeka, No. 14, September 2000] 
The aircraft were initially used in a series of low-flying 
manoeuvres over the town of Wamena in the Bali em Valley 
on 26 and 27 September, apparently as back up to a police 
operation to remove the West Papuan 'Morning Star' flag. 
Tensions were already high in the town following an inci-
dent in which police beat five Papuan men the previous day. 
A witness explained why - bearing in mind the history of 
aerial bombings and human rights violations in the Baliem 
Valley - the very appearance of the Hawks was particularly 
terrifying for those on the ground: 
'Three Hawks, sold by the United Kingdom to Indonesia 
are now demonstrating their power over West Papua in 
Wamena at the time I am typing this e-mail. .. When I was a 
child in 1976-77, they did the same with Bronco fighters . 
The Bronco fighters were flying over my village and then 
some months later they did both bomb my villages and they 
killed hundreds of us . I have lost my relatives, members of 
my family and my villagers . I do not want this to be 
repeated in this civilised and transparent world." ' 
The operation was a disturbing echo of events in East 
Timor last year when a Hawk aircraft flew low over Dili 
terrifying East Timorese who had also suffered appallingly 
from Bronco bombing raids in the past [see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No. 154/155, p. 34] . 
The Hawks were involved in further manoeuvres over 
Wamena when the aircraft made their presence felt over the 
capital , Jayapura, on 29 September during an official cere-
mony to welcome 650 more troops to the province. By the 
time of the tragic events of 6 October (see separate item), 
the Hawks had been replaced by US-made Skyhawks. 
British Government's response 
After last year's incident in Dili, the Indonesians claimed 
that the Hawk was being used in a 'routine training exercise 
connected with national reconnaisance'. Foreign Secretary, 
Robin Cook, initially appeared to defend Indonesia by 
saying that the aircraft did not engage itself in combat. 
Eventually he obtained an assurance that British equipment 
would not be used again in East Timor. 
On this occasion, Indonesia claimed that the Hawks were 
being used for training exercises to ensure the armed forces 
could protect Indonesia's borders. The Foreign Office did 
not challenge this line initially, but thanks in part to pressure 
from NGOs such as ELS-HAM (the Institute for Human 
Rights Study and Advocacy) in West Papua and TAPOL and 
Campaign Against Arms Trade in the UK, the British 
embassy in Jakarta made representations to the Indonesian 
Government, which led to the aircraft being withdrawn 
from West Papua on 5 October. 
Despite this, the situation for the people on the ground 
has not improved. The Hawks have been replaced by US-
supplied Skyhawk A-4s which will almost certainly carry 
out similar intimidatory operations. 
Arms sales continue 
Britain and the EU have refused to countenance a renewed 
arms embargo on Indonesia. This means that the armed 
forces continues to receive spare parts for lethal equipment 
from British suppliers. The Foreign Office has acknowl-
edged that the Government has licensed the export of spare 
parts for Saladin armoured vehicles of the type involved in 
the Maluku conflict (see below). This year's annual report 
on UK arms exports indicates that the Government has also 
licensed spare parts for Hawk aircraft. TAPOL believes it is 
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hypocritical of the Government to claim credit for not 
licensing the export of armoured vehicles and Hawks while 
it is licensing spares parts. The export of parts which render 
lethal equipment operational is equally unacceptable. 
A report in the Independent revealed how an Associated 
Press cameraman witnessed a Saladin being used as cover 
by troops taking sides in fighting in Ambon: 
'"The military were definitely helping the Muslim side 
attack the Christians and the Saladin was part of that. ' The 
attackers came under fire from Christians snipers in the city 
of Ambon on 15 July, despite the presence of Indonesian 
soldiers providing them with covering fire. The Saladin was 
positioned between the soldiers and the snipers, rotating its 
cannon in their direction. ' 
"It wasn'tfiring," said Mr Jatmiko [the cameraman]. "But 
because the Saladin was there, that made the Christian 
snipers scared so they didn't shoot again. It was helping 
[the Muslims}. If they'd been trying to break up the clash, 
the Saladin would have stayed. But they came for just five 
minutes to protect the soldiers and then left. [Independent, 
10 October 2000]" 
In resisting renewed demands for an arms embargo, the 
Foreign Office has drawn a distinction between East Timor 
and other situations. They have suggested, incorrectly, that 
the European Union arms embargo, imposed in September 
1999and lifted in January 2000, related specifically to the 
illegal occupation of East Timor. This implies that the 
armed forces have greater licence to do what they want with 
British equipment in other areas, such as West Papua, Aceh 
or Maluku, because they are regarded as part of Indonesia. 
Nothwithstanding this attitude, TAPOL will continue to 
press the British Government to respond quickly wherever 
British equipment is used for repressive purposes. * 
continued from page 21 
now in West Papua is around ten thousand, including 650 
Brimob troops guarding the Freeport copper-and-gold mine 
in Timika. 
According to unconfirmed reports Jakarta has also sent 
elite troops from Kopassus, the unit blamed for orchestrat-
ing much of the violence in East Timor last year, while the 
security forces are encouraging the formation of East 
Timor-style militia to provide an excuse for a brutal military 
crackdown. [Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November] 
Army chief of staff General Endriartono Sutarto said: 
'Now we are witnessing many regions demanding to secede 
from the state .. . I call on the people to share a united vision 
on national integrity and to eliminate their vested interests.' 
Major Putranto, one of the commanders of the fresh troops, 
said before leaving the city ofMakassar: 'We are prepared to 
defend national sovereignty, because that's our main duty.' 
[Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November] 
Seven die in Merauke 
On 4 November, Brimob troops opened fire on Papuans 
who were defending a flag at one of the many local posts of 
the Satgas Papua in the city of Merauke. The attack followed 
a quite unrelated argument between two Papuan families in 
another part of the city which led to an agreement for repre-
sentatives of the two families to meet and patch up their 
quarrel at one of the Satgas Papua posts. 
I ARMS TRADE 
The historic West Papuan People's Congress in May 2000 
Meanwhile, a Brimob member attacked two men in the 
street, apparently from one of the feuding families , and lost 
his balance and fell , which drew the attention of a hostile 
crowd of people. This incident led Brimob troops to take 
vengeance on flag-raisers, with tragic consequences. They 
turned up at several Satgas Papua posts and started tearing 
down the flags , while shooting indiscriminately. At one 
post, three people were shot dead and 15 were wounded 
although they had offered no resistance when the Brimob 
troops arrived. 
Nine days after issuing a statement and report about the 
above, Jayapura-based ELS-HAM, the Institute for Human 
Rights Study and Advocacy, issued an update saying that the 
death toll had risen to seven. One person who had been 
arrested was severely beaten and was dead on arrival in 
hospital and one of the men wounded on 4 November had 
since died. A sixth man died when troops driving past a 
Satgas Papua post opened fire. The next day, troops made 
menacing gestures towards crowds attending the funeral of 
the latest victim. 
The seventh victim was a non-Papuan settler who died 
when the vehicle he was riding in was burnt by Papuans, 
frustrated and traumatised by the attacks made over the 
previous week by the security forces. ELS-HAM also 
reported that one school-pupil who was wounded had a leg 
amputated while several others were still on the critical list. 
These incidents point to an extremely volatile situation, 
with trigger-happy troops and Papuans venting their anger 
because of the many casualties, while settlers are now 
becoming targets. 
Presidium leaders to face charges 
Theys Hiyo Eluay and other Papua Presidium Council 
leaders will soon face charges in court under Article 106 of 
the Criminal Code for actions hostile to the state which 
carries a maximum sentence of life. Chief of police for Irian 
Jaya said the other Presidium leaders who would be tried 
were Thaha Al Hamid, Agus Alua, Herman Awom, Don 
A.L. Flassy, John Mambor and Mrs. Beatriks Koibur. The 
trials would probably be held in December or early January. 
Theys will also be charged under other articles related to 
'separatist' activities for hoisting the Morning Star flag. 'We 
also have sufficient evidence of his involvement in the 
second Papuan Congress (from May 29 to June 3), which 
vowed to declare Irian Jaya's independence on Dec. 1 this 
year,' Wenas said. 
This is not the first time some of those named have been 
threatened with indictments but earlier threats did not result 
in anything concrete. * 
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Police attack on flag-raisers ends in tragedy 
Members of the notorious Brimob police force, in a joint operation with troops, gunned down West 
Papuan flag-raisers in the Central Highland town of Wamena. In the ensuing clash, at least thirty 
people were killed including settlers from Indonesia who, like the Papuan casualties, became the inno-
cent victims of a provocation to incite ethnic conflict. The Wamena Tragedy was used as the justifica-
tion for a clampdown on widespread peaceful Papuan opposition to Indonesian rule. 
Wamena, the capital of Jayawijaya district, is located in 
the Baliem Valley, several hundred kilometres south of 
Jayapura and is accessible only by air. It is the home of the 
Dani people and was at the centre of a murderous 
Indonesian campaign in 1977, including an aerial attack 
that killed hundreds of people. 
The police struck their lethal blow on 6 October against a 
group of Papuans defending one of the many flag-poles in 
Wamena, atop which the Papuan Kejora (Morning Star) was 
fluttering. They cut down the pole with a chainsaw and 
opened fire from close range, killing two of the flag-raisers 
instantly. Eleven people were also wounded by gunfire. The 
unprovoked attack enraged scores of Papuans who took to 
the streets; there were running battles between heavily 
armed security forces and Papuans, some of whom were 
using bows and arrows. When some of the police took 
refuge in areas inhabited by settlers, the settlers were set 
upon, causing a large number of casualties. Besides the 
thirty deaths of whom most were settlers, 45 people were 
wounded, including some police officers. 
Low-flying Hawk aircraft used 
In the days prior to the operation, local witnesses reported 
that several super-sonic Hawk fighter aircraft had zoomed 
in low over Wamena, intimidating the inhabitants. In mid 
September, it was reported that three British-made Hawks 
had been stationed in Biak's Manuhua airbase for a three-
month period. [Cendrawasih Pos, 14 September] Several 
sightings of the aircraft were reported to TAPOL. Our 
protests led to high-level discussions in Jakarta between the 
British ambassador and the air force chief of staff, follow-
ing which it was announced that the three Hawks were being 
withdrawn and replaced by US-made Skyhawk A-4s. 
[Cendrawasih Pos, 4 October] 
Scores arrested and maltreated 
Scores of people were rounded up, including 25 children. 
When the children were released two days later, they 
described how the detainees were being brutally tortured 
and beaten, while many wounded people were not being 
treated for their injuries. 
For several weeks following the incident, human rights 
monitors from ELS-HAM, the Jayapura-based Institute for 
Human Rights Study and Advocacy, were barred from 
entering Wamena to check on the number of detainees and 
the conditions in which they were being held, and to provide 
legal aid to those being interrogated. The two flag-raisers 
shot dead were named as Agustinus Murip and Eliezer Alua. 
Yohanes A third death occurred when Udin sustained severe 
injuries while in police custody; he was kicked and beaten 
and was pronounced dead on arrival in hospital. Udin was 
arrested because he had been taking photos of the police 
operation. (A US tourist who happened to be in Wamena 
and took photos of the operation was later accused of being 
a 'CIA spy'. He was deported because he had shown his 
photos to other people.) 
ELS-HAM reported that a reign of terror prevailed when 
dozens of Papuans being held by the police were subjected 
to inhumane treatment. They were ordered to strip down to 
their underpants, kicked, beaten with rifle butts and canes, 
slashed with razors and had pistols thrust into their mouths. The 
detainees were even ordered to drink the urine of police officers. 
On 23 October, ELS-HAM reported that seventeen people 
were likely to be charged with offences relating to the 
Wamena Tragedy. The number could rise as the police have 
been exerting pressure on local leaders of the Papuan 
Presidium Council to identify others allegedly involved. 
Provoking ethnic conflict 
One of the most disturbing features of the Wamena 
Tragedy was that there were many non-Papuan settlers 
among the casualties. With human rights monitors being 
excluded from the area, it has not been possible to establish 
the exact death toll though most of the dead are known to 
have been non-Papuans. The incident led to thousands of 
non-Papuan families fleeing their homes and seeking refuge 
with the local police or army. Most medical personnel also 
fled, leaving hospitals and clinics seriously under-staffed. 
Although Papuans resent the fact that hundreds of thou-
sands of settlers from Indonesia have flooded into West 
Papua and now control the commercial sector and the civil 
service, there is no history of ethnic conflict. At least a quar-
ter of the population of West Papua of 2.5 million are 
settlers from Indonesia, radically altering the demographic 
character particularly in the urban areas. 
At the height of the turmoil on 6 October, the police were 
urging non-Papuans to 'stick together' and defend them-
selves. Non-Papuans were later advised by the local police 
to set up a self-defence ( siskamling) system which the 
police promised to support. [ELS-HAM Report, 17 
October] On 23 October, the country's leading newspaper, 
Kompas, alleged that 65 non-Papuans were being held 
hostage in Tiom, a town west of Wamena, by 'thousands of 
armed tribesmen' who were threatening to kill the hostages 
if anyone tried to pull down the Papuan flag. Human rights 
monitors who had just visited the town heard nothing about 
these inflammatory reports and the following day, local 
police denied the story. 
In a statement on 21 October, ELS-HAM warned that the 
local police were trying to pit non-Papuans against Papuans 
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by urging the former to 'defend themselves' and making 
them feel very insecure. This was stirring up mistrust 
between the communities. 
There have been fears for many months of sinister moves 
to instigate ethnic conflict in West Papua, along the lines of 
the conflict in Maluku. This may explain why the Wamena 
Tragedy took such a grim turn. The Rev. Herman Awom, a 
member of the Papuan Presidium Council, insisted that 
Papuan people 'don't hate the migrants', adding that 
emotions were inflamed when the police refused to negoti-
ate about pulling down the flag and then took refuge with 
the settlers. [Reuters, 8 October] 
Agreement violated 
The downfall of the dictator Suharto in May 1998 created 
conditions in West Papua as elsewhere in Indonesia for 
more open expression of opinion. Flag-raising is a powerful 
manifestation of Papuan identity, closely associated with a 
Papuan sense of injustice at their treatment since Indonesia 
took over control in 1963. During the Suharto era, occa-
sional flag-raising incidents were treated harshly and many 
people served long prison terms for such peaceful actions. 
After his election in October 1999, President 
Abdurrahman Wahid adopted a more tolerant attitude, 
giving the go-ahead for the practice as a legitimate expres-
sion of opinion. Throughout 2000 and particularly since the 
Second Papuan People's Congress in June, the Kejora has 
been a common sight in towns and villages. Conditions 
were set according to which the Papuan flag should fly side 
by side with and slightly lower than the Indonesian red-and-
white. 
This more relaxed atmosphere began to change after thou-
sands of extra troops arrived in West Papua at the end of 
August. This did not deter the flag-raisers however and 
anxiety grew that a policy shift in Jakarta might soon end in 
tears. On 3 October, leaders of the Papuan Presidium 
Council held talks with top-level civilian, police and mili-
tary authorities in Jayapura at which an accord was reached: 
flags could be flown unmolested until 19 October and in the 
meanwhile, the PPC would hold talks with President Wahid 
on how to proceed regarding this and other matters. 
The clampdown in Wamena three days later was in clear 
violation of this accord. Sources in Jayapura say that while 
it was the chief of police of Irian Jaya who ordered the 
strike, he was acting on orders from the national police chief 
in Jakarta. Higher up the line of command was Vice-
President Megawati Sukarnoputri who is known to be 
strongly opposed to Wahid's policy of tolerance. She was 
instrumental in persuading him to withdraw his decision to 
address the Second Papua Congress earlier this year. 
Five days after the Wamena Tragedy, a special cabinet 
meeting was convened in Jakarta for the express purpose of 
ending what was described as the 'dualism' in policy in Irian 
Jaya, as Papua is still officially known. The cabinet meeting 
on 12 October which was chaired by Megawati decided that 
unfurling the Papuan flag had been 'distorted' into become 
a manifestation of 'separatist sentiments' and would be 
prohibited forthwith. The meeting also ordered the immedi-
ate dissolution of Satgas Papua. This defence force came 
into prominence during the Second Papuan Congress when 
it provided security for the meeting and has attracted tens of 
thousands of members in all parts of West Papua. Few 
members are armed and then only with traditional weapons. 
I 
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The Presidium Council was condemned for claiming to 
represent the Papuan people and would only be recognised 
as a group with whom to engage in efforts for reconcilia-
tion. 
Crisis atmosphere persists 
As the deadline of 19 October approached, there were 
fears that more bloody incidents could occur. In Merauke 
and Yapen Waropen, Papuan flag-raisers were defying 
instructions from the local police to pull down their flags . 
In Jayapura, thousands of people were reported to be 
converging on the provincial capital to give support to flag-
raisers. Theys Uluay, chair of the Papuan Presidium 
Council, was unable to persuade several hundred Papuans 
not to persist in order to avert yet more bloodshed. 
Faced with the looming crisis, the provincial chief of 
police announced a last-minute extension of the 19 October 
deadline without setting a new one. When PPC leaders met 
President Wahid in Jakarta on 23 October, they came out 
admitting that the two sides' positions were far apart. 
Embroiled in a power struggle that threatens the survival of 
his presidency, Wahid clearly had nothing to offer. On the 
same day, the coordinating minister for security affairs, 
retired lieutenant-general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
insisted that the police response in Wamena had been 
'proportionate', and attacked the Papuan Presidium Council 
for seeking support from Pacific nations in their quest for a 
re-run of the so-called 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969 which 
resulted in West Papua's absorption into lndonesia. 
With unprecedented attention being devoted by members 
of the government to the situation in West Papua, this would 
not be the only place in Indonesia where lives have been 
sacrificed on the altar of political conflict within the coun-
try's political elite in Jakarta. Meanwhile, many Papuans are 
planning to celebrate 1 December to mark the day in 1961 
when an elected Papuan Council adopted the Kejora flag as 
their national emblem amid promises from the Dutch colo-
nial administration of a process leading to the territory's 
eventual independence. 
On 9 November, it was announced that agreement was 
reached between the provincial authorities in Jayapura 
including the police and the military on the one hand, and 
the Presidium leadership on the other, for Papuan flags to be 
removed from all government buildings after 1 December. 
The agreement appears to involve a ceremonial hoisting of 
the Indonesian and Papuan flags on an equal footing on 1 
December, and thereafter, the Papuan flag will only be 
hoisted over at the Presidium leader's home and other 
Papuan locations. 
Presidium chairman Theys acknowledged that he could 
not guarantee that all Papuans would comply with this 
agreement. 
More troops sent to West Papua 
Two more Kostrad battalions were sent to West Papua in 
mid November in anticipation of actions in favour of inde-
pendence there on 1 December. These battalions, amounting 
to nearly two thousand men, will bring the number of rein-
forcements sent to West Papua since August this year to 
around five thousand. The total number of troops and police 
continued on page 19 
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Self-determination for Papua raised at UN 
For the first time since 1969 when the UN General Assembly shamefully struck West Papua off its 
agenda after a fraudulent A ct of 'Free' Choice, the issue of West Papua's right to self-determination was 
raised at the Millennium Summit of the General Assembly held in September. 
.Two South Pacific countries, Vanuatu and Nauru, gave 
then full support to the need for an act of self-determina-
tion. 
Vanuatu 
Prime Minister Maautamate B Sope of Vanuatu made a 
strong plea to world leaders to right the many wrongs of the 
UN 'so that we can embark on the new millennium with a 
clear conscience'. He went on to say: 
'As the chairman and an active member of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group which is committed to promoting and safe-
guarding the Melanesian identity, values, traditions and rights, 
the Republic of Vanuatu calls on the United Nations to review 
the political and legal basis of its own undertakings in the 50s 
and 60s in relation to the fundamental rights and the fate of 
our Melanesian brothers and sisters in the Asia-Pacific region, 
in particular in West Papua.' 
He condemned the so-called Act of Free Choice in West 
Papua as 'a mockery to the fundamental principles on 
human rights and self-determination clearly enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations (which) cannot continue 
to turn a blind eye on its own past failures which has led to 
three long, agonising decades of injustice, tragedy and 
guerrilla warfare in West Papua. It is both morally and 
legally wrong to do so. The United Nations has competent 
agencies and institutions, such as the Committee of 24 or 
the International Court of Justice, which should be tasked 
to look into this or give an advisory opinion. The 
Netherlands which was the former colonial authority, in 
particular, should recognise that they have some responsi-
bility in helping to resolve the unfortunate situation of West 
Papua in a peaceful and transparent manner. ' 
Nauru 
. The President of Nauru, Bernard Dowiyogo MP, speak-
mg on 7 September, for the first time at the General 
Assembly following his country's entry into the UN in 
1999, referred to three UNHCR personnel killed in 
Atambua, West Timor, on the previous day and expressed 
support for the people of East Timor through their final step 
to nationhood. 
'On the other hand, our Melanesian brothers and sisters in 
West Papua are still striving to break the imposition of colo-
nial domination and foreign control, following the so-called 
act of free choice in 1969. It is imperative that West Papua 
be given the rightful opportunity of a democratic referen-
dum of its indigenous people, to exercise at last their right 
to self-determination. The United Nations cannot stand by 
and witness the destruction of the people of ~st Papua . ... 
Nauru would therefore support a UN resolution that permits 
the people of West Papua the choice of self-determination.' 
Papuan leaders attend S Pacific forum 
Inching forward in getting their case recognised at an 
international level, eight West Papuan activists from the 
Papauan Presidium Council were given seats at the annual 
South Pacific Regional Council held this year in Kiribati. 
The West Papuans were included in the official delegations 
from Nauru and Vanuatu, making it possible for them to rub 
shoulders with the heads of governments in the Pacific 
which include Australia and Aoteroa (New Zealand). 
Their presence at the meeting resulted in the question of 
West Papua being discussed for the first time in this impor-
tant international forum. While it was obvious from the start 
that any attempt to have the summit take a position on the 
question of West Papua's right to self-determination would 
not be acceptable to the Australian and New Zealand prime 
ministers, John Howard and Helen Clarke, they were unable 
to prevent the meeting from discussing the human rights 
situation and the recent acts of violence. 
The final communique expres&ed 'deep concern about the 
recent violence and loss of life in West Papua' and called on 
both sides 'to resolve their differences peacefully through 
dialogue and consultation' and to uphold the human rights 
of the residents of the province. 
It was at the insistence of John Howard that the commu-
nique underlined Indonesia's position as 'the sovereign 
authority' in West Papua. The result was welcomed by 
Franzalbert Joku, international affairs moderator of the 
Papuan Presidium Council, as being a better outcome than 
they ha~ expected. 'I was concern,' he said, 'that West Papua 
was gomg to be kept off the agenda.' As one Australian 
newspaper commented, 'The Australian Government is 
accepting the inevitability of a heightened focus on West 
Papua while standing by Indonesia's sovereignty.' 
[Australian Financial Review, 30 October] 
Signs of that heightened focus has come in several forms . 
One was a memorandum of understanding signed between 
Jacob Rumbiak, a West Papuan independence leader and 
Greg Sword, vice-president of the Australian Coun~il of 
Trade Unions, which calls for a UN referendum on the 
future of West Papua. Greg Sword, who is also president of 
the Australian Labour Party, said the Australian trade union 
movement wants the UN General Assembly to examine 
Indonesia's claim over the independent territory of West 
Papua, which is so close to our northern shores. ACTU 
spokesman Alan Matheson said that the handover of West 
Papua to Indonesia 'has led to the deaths of tens of thou-
sands of civilians and spiralling human rights abuses.' [The 
Australian, 25 October] 
A week earlier, church leaders from Australia and West 
Papua. issued a joint statement calling for an 'East Timor-
style mdependence ballot to stop the violence in West 
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Papua'. The Australian churchman endorsing this statement 
was Anglican Bishop Hilton Deakin, known for many years 
as an outspoken supporter of East Timor's right to self-
determination. The West Papuan churchman was Pastor 
Martin Luther Wanma who was attending an Asia Pacific 
regional conference of religious leaders in Melbourne. 
[AFP, 19 October] 
At the same time, Australia's Greens Party attempted to 
WEST PAPUA 
table a motion in the Senate saying: 'The Senate supports 
the right of the West Papuan people to raise the Morning 
Star flag' , but the move was blocked by other parties in the 
Senate. Senator Bob Brown of Tasmania who had tried to 
table the motion later announced that he had set up a new 
organisation, Parliamentarians for West Papua. * 
International West Papua Solidarity Meeting 
Early 2000, an initiative was started to organise a woldd-wide solidarity meeting on West Papua. Three 
organisations: West Papua Action (WPA) in Dublin, TAPOL in London and the Foundation Study & 
Information Papua Peoples (PAVO) in Utrecht became the Organising Committee of the conference. 
The lively conference was held in Denekamp, the Netherlands on 10-12 October 2000 and it was 
decided that similar conferences would be held in the future. Next year the conference will take place 
in Germany. 
Participants for the conference came from many coun-
tries, including the US, Canada and Australia. European 
partcipation came from Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands and the UK. Al long way from the Pacific 
came a representative from PCRC in Fiji. West Papua was 
represented by three people: Tom Beanal, vice-chair of the 
Papua Presidium, Willy Mandowen who represented 
FORERI and Sisilia Sokoy, a staff member of FORERI. 
This conference is an expression of the growing solidar-
ity world-wide among NGOs and individuals about the 
plight of the West Papuans. The fall of the Suharto dicta-
torship and the growing movement in West Papua itself to 
determine their own political future was the bottom-line of 
the Denekamp conference. A special session was held on 
the last day of the Denekamp conference how to increase 
and improve lobby work in order to internationalise the 
issue of West Papua even more. In the last few years 
newsletters, e-mail groups, press releases and petitions on 
West Papua has brought the issue much more in the inter-
national press. 
The conference aimed to work towards a more co-ordi-
nated and better organised solidarity network to support 
the process of reconciliation and dialogue in West Papua. 
Another aim is to alert the international community in 
general and the UN in particular of the need for the injus-
tice suffered by the West Papuan people to be rectified. 
The conference was a bit overshadowed by the devel-
opments in West Papua (bloody clashes in Wamena and the 
Indonesian decision to ban the Morning Star Flag). A 
continuous flow of information went from Port Numbai, 
Jakarta, London to the Denekamp conference, creating a 
lively discussion in the conference. 
Program of the conference 
The conference started with four keynote speeches, 
Carmel Budiardjo from TAPOL spoke about the situation 
in Indonesia and Willy Mandowen from FORERI raised 
the important topic of dialogue between the governmen~ in 
Jakarta and the Papuan leaders. In the afternoon sess10n 
the conference continued with an explanation about the 
structure of the Papua Presidium by Viktor Kaisiepo and 
Tom Beanal and the last speaker(s) were Chris Ballard 
and Octovianus Mote on the human rights situation in 
West Papua and strategies to improve the situation. A 
plenary discussion followed the speeches. 
In the evening two recent video programmes were 
shown: 'The Act of No Choice' from the BBC and 'The 
Papuan Peoples Congress', a report by AVRO, a Dutch 
broadcasting program. 
The next day a wide range of topics were discussed, 
making the nature of the conference a proper working 
conference. Topics were discussed such as: self-deter-
mination, human rights, natural resources, military and 
arms sales. Practical matters like how to expand the 
network and how to internationalise further the actions 
for West Papua became obvious topics of discussion. 
Public meeting and other activities 
A public meeting was organised in Utrecht with the 
three people in the West Papua delegation. Fifteen 
people from the International Solidarity Meeting also 
participated in this public rally. Some 200 people 
attended the meeting, including many West papuans 
living in the Netherlands. 
A Papuan delegation also met officials from the Dutch 
Foreign Affairs Ministry and they also met some Dutch 
Members of Parliament from the Foreign Affairs 
Parliamentary Commission. Visits were also made to 
Dutch NGOs and funding agencies to discuss the possi-
bilitiesof future support in the reconciliation and 
process of dialogue. 
The conference was lucky to have two important 
spokespesrons of the West Papuan people to explain 
about the situation and strategies of the struggle. Their 
profound knowledge about the political situation n 
Indonesia also helped to deepen the understanding of 
the strategy of dialogue with Jakarta. They spoke with 
convincing determination and credibility. * 
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Police interfering in labour disputes 
In the days of Suharto, military intervention was a regular feature when workers were in dispute with 
their employers. Local army officers used their muscle to force workers and their leaders to accept 
onerous terms from their bosses and frequently faced dismissal after disputes had been resolved. More 
recently, the military took a back seat, leaving such interference to local thugs. But now the police have 
taken on the mantle of bearing down on workers. 
In a press release issued on 15 November, the SBSI, the 
Indonesian Workers Prosperity Union, strongly condemned 
the police for intervening in labour disputes. This has a 
intimidatory impact on workers involved in strike actions or 
other forms of struggle for their rights. A recent example 
was the dispute with PT Maspion in East Java where the 
management called in the police. Workers were dragged 
away to the East Java police command and held for a week 
then transferred to another police command in Sidoarjo. On 
13 November, the head of the SBSI unit at PT Maspion was 
again taken in by the police for no apparent reason. 
Such intervention is in contravention of Article 28 of the 
Indonesian Constitution as well as ILO Conventions 87 and 
98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining both 
of which have been ratified by Indonesia. It also contra-
venes the law on trade union rights adopted by the 
Indonesian parliament earlier this year. 
The SBSI also complained about police intervention in 
on-going disputes in East Kalimantan with PT Kaltim 
Prima Coal and PT Vico Indonesia. If this becomes a regu-
lar feature of labour disputes, said the SBSI, it will mean 
that nothing has changed since the days of Suharto's New 
Order. 
A new wave of strikes 
ln September the government quietly put the oil prices 
up 12%, which immediately created a dramatic upsurge of 
prices of the other basic necessities .. Six months earlier, in 
April , the government was forced to suspend the oil price 
rise because of the many protests in society. This time the 
trade unions were taken by surprise. Only on 10 October the 
different unions in different cities managed to organise a 
day of action against the increasing cost of living. 
In Jakarta a few thousand workers marched from the 
Independence Monument to the Merdeka Palace. The march 
created traffic jams in the inner city but the organisers 
expected more people to participate. In Surabaya, the 
second biggest city, around 12,000 workers marched to the 
City Hall. The Mayor of Surabaya, addressed the demon-
strated and gave his support to the demands of the workers 
for a hefty wage increase. In other cities similar demonstra-
tions were held. 
The economic meltdown since 1997 han't been favourable 
for the growth of an organised labour movement in 
Indonesia. The explosion of the unemployment figure was 
the main reason that workers hesitated to put strong 
demands to their bosses. But the double digit inflation e and 
the price increases give the workers no other option but to 
protest. The downfall of Suharto meant the end of one 
corporatist union and in fact trade unions, both on national, 
regional or factory level have indeed mushroomed. 
A whole range of trade unions 
On national level a record of 23 unions have been established 
in the last two years. On factory level some 9,000 unions have 
been registered while 44 unions have emerged in the state 
sector. During the mass actions it became more evident that the 
unions also represent a wide spectrum from radical to 'boss-
friendly' workers unions. This 'hundred flowers bloom' period 
is understandable after a three decade of muzzling workers 
rights by the Suharto regime, but it also creates difficulties in 
finding a common platform for mutual demands. In Central 
Java the different unions have managed to create a common 
platform but in Jakarta the demands of the different unions 
could not find any compromise. Future workers actions will 
sift the good from the bad unions. * 
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